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In early 1868 William E. Gladstone presented several 
bills in Parliament to disestablish the Church of Ireland. 
Prior to 1868 Gladstone had stated his opposition to the 
official connection between the Church of Ireland and the 
State. Gladstone, however, had also claimed that he was not 
in favor of immediate action and instead advocated restraint 
in attacking the Church of Ireland. The 1860's also saw the 
rise of the Fenian organization. The Fenians were dedicated 
to the overthrow of English rule in Ireland and the 
establishment of an Irish republic. The role that the 
Fenians played in convincing Gladstone to disestablish the 
Irish church has received varying interpretations from 
historians; yet no attempt has been made to look closely at 
the issue. 
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The most important source available is Hansards 
Parliamentary Debates. Much of the formal discussion on the 
issue of church disestablishment took place in the House of 
Commons. Hansards gives an excellent account of the 
arguments pro and con on this issue. Hansards also provides 
the best available evidence of Gladstone's changing attitude 
toward the necessity of action on the question of church 
disestablishment. Various diaries, newspapers, periodicals, 
and at least one book written during the period in question 
(J. F. Maguire's The Irish in America) were used to assess 
the reactions of Gladstone's contemporaries. These sources 
were also used to determine the state of English opinion 
toward the Irish in general, the Fenians in particular, and 
English views on the necessity of Irish reform. 
The execution of three Fenians in 1867 prompted an 
outpouring of sympathy for these "martyrs" from the Irish--
including some Irishment who had previously been unsympa-
thetic toward the Fenian movement. Gladstone had hoped to 
proceed in a calm and deliberate manner on the question of 
disestablishment. He realized, however, that reform of the 
Irish church could not be delayed any longer. Gladstone 
feared that further delay would increase popular 
sympathy for the Fenians in Ireland, which he also 
feared would encourage many of the Irish to question 
the wisdom of the Union between England and Ireland. He 
hoped that prompt redress of Irish grievances, of which 
disestablishment was one of the most prominent, would 
encourage the Irish to maintain the Union. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In late 1867, w. E. Gladstone, one of the leaders of 
the Liberal Party, reluctantly came to the conclusion that 
the Church of Ireland would have to be disestablished. 
Gladstone's motion in 1868 caused the downfall of the 
minority government of Disraeli. The elections in late 
1868 were fought primarily on the issue of the 
disestablishment of the Church of Ireland. The Liberal 
victory in 1868 meant the end of the Church of Ireland as 
the officially established state church. 1 In early 1869 
legislation was introduced that not only disestablished the 
Church of Ireland, but also disendowed it. Despite 
disharmonious rumblings from the House of Lords, the bill 
became law, and on the 1st of January 1871, the Church of 
Ireland ceased to exist. 
This thesis will argue that Gladstone was motivated, 
in large part, to disestablish the Irish church in 1869 by 
the potential threat of extensive Irish sympathy for the 
Fenian cause. Gladstone had refused to support the motions 
of 1863, 1865, and 1866 that had, in one fashion or another, 
attacked the established church in Ireland. In 1867 he was 
willing to give his personal support, but not the support of 
the Liberal Party, to the issue of disestablishment. 
Gladstone's gradual acceptance of the necessity of action on 
the question of the Irish church was motivated by the 
increasing popularity of the Fenians in Ireland. In the 
1860s, Gladstone had taken part in all of the debates on 
the Irish church, except in 1866, when he did not enter the 
debate on Gray's motion 2 and expressed his opinion that the 
Irish church was an injustice that would have to be taken 
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care of sometime in the unforeseeable future. Gladstone was 
a cautious politican--he felt that precipitate change was 
to be as feared as injustice. Thus he preferred to address 
the question of the Irish in a slow and deliberate manner. 
Discontent in Ireland, and the Fenians in particular, 
gradually convinced Gladstone that immediate action was 
necessary. Once Gladstone realized that further delay might 
create even more public sympathy for the Fenians and 
further threaten the union between Ireland and England, he 
moved quickly to remove the sources of Irish discontent, one 
of which was the Church of Ireland as a state-supported 
. t• t t• 3 ins 1 u ion. Gladstone hoped that disestablishment would 
make the Irish more amenable to English rule. 
The debate on disestablishment took place against a 
backdrop of rising discontent in Ireland, of which 
discontent the Fenians were the most conspicuous example. 4 
The Fenians came to the notice of the English authorities in 
1863, at which time they were considered to be 
inconsequential. By 1865 the organization had grown so 
rapidly that the English quickly moved in, arrested the 
leaders, and closed down their newspaper, The Irish People. 
The English became so worried about the spread of the 
organization that in 1866 the Liberal government under the 
leadership of Russell asked for, and got, a suspension 
of the Act of Habeas Corpus in Ireland. Throughout 1866 
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the Fenians remained relatively quiet. In 1867 they 
illustrated their determination to establish an Irish 
republic: they attempted a raid on the munitions depot at 
Chester Castle and engaged in a series of abortive risings 
in Ireland. 5 In late 1867, three Fenian conspirators were 
executed at Manchester for their part in the death of an 
English policeman. 6 In December 1867, the Fenians blew a 
hole in the wall of Clerkenwell prison in an attempt to 
rescue some of their brethren. They used too much dynamite 
and several people in the surrounding neighborhood were 
killed. The execution of the "Manchester Martyrs" generated 
a substantial amount of sympathy for the Fenians in Ireland. 
The Clerkenwell explosion enraged English opinion. 
Assessing Gladstone's motives for many of his actions 
can be difficult, for Gladstone was a complicated man. He 
had not always been a liberal: he had first sat in 
Parliament as a Canningite Tory, and in 1831 and 1832 he 
had actively opposed parliamentary reform (which he voted 
against in Parliament). The battle for the repeal of the 
Corn Laws in 1846 had transformed his political position; 
Gladstone found himself between the two major parties as a 
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Peelite. Finally, in 1859, he decided to join the Liberal 
government of Lords Palmerston and Russell. 
Theologically, Gladstone started out as an evangelical 
(under the influence of his sister) and was very 
conservative in his views on the correct relationship 
between church and state. In 1838 he published a book 
entitled The State in Its Relations With the Church. His - -- --- --
book defended the current relationship between the Churches 
of England and Ireland and the state. Gladstone basically 
argued that the state had a conscience and was obligated to 
support true and correct religion, i.e. Anglican, wherever 
it could. By 1845 his religious views had changed; he had 
become a high Anglican under the influence of the Oxford 
Movement. He also no longer believed that the state was 
able to determine truth in religion. On the other hand, 
Gladstone never stopped hoping that "there would be one 
Church and that the main role of the State would be to 
support it "7 Until his death in 1898, he was willing 
to come out of retirement to def end the Church of England 
against the disestablishment schemes of the dissenters and 
radicals. Gladstone recognized, however, that he lived in 
an imperfect world, and that his goal could not be achieved. 
Thus it was necessary, according to Gladstone, for the state 
to be as neutral toward other religions as possible. 8 
This transformation of Gladstone's beliefs and 
political alliances caused many problems in assessing 
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Gladstone's role in the politics of disestablishment. Were 
his motives political, religious, or some combination of the 
two? While I have chosen to focus on the political rather 
than on the religious aspects of Gladstone's realization in 
late 1867 that the Irish church had to be disestablished 
immediately, Gladstone's views on religion are not to be 
disregarded. 
Religion was an important and significant aspect of 
Gladstone's whole life. One historian had gone as far as to 
state that his "primary interests were religious, not 
political." 9 This assessment is, in many ways, too extreme. 
Gladstone had a deep interest in both religion and politics. 
In 1832 he had struggled with the question of whether he 
should go into the church or if he should remain in 
politics; he chose to remain in politics. The historian may 
be able to separate politics from religion, but in 
Gladstone's mind they were too interwoven to be pulled apart 
so easily. When Gladstone had finally decided upon the 
necessity of championing Irish reform, it is not surprising 
that he first acted on a religious issue. Still, this 
thesis will contend that the political issue of Irish reform 
and its connection with the Fenians was the most important 
issue to Gladstone in 1867 and 1868. Whatever his feelings 
were toward state-supported religions in the early 1860s, 
they were not enough to prompt him to action on the question 
of disestablishment. It took the threat of widespread Irish 
sympathy for the Fenians to convince Gladstone that there 
was no time to be wasted in addressing the issue of the 
Irish church. 
The question is, why did Gladstone wait until 1868 to 
present motions that would disestablish and disendow the 
Church of Ireland, when he had had several chances to do so 
before then? Many interpretations exist, but none are 
entirely complete or correct. 
E. J. Feuchtwanger focuses on Gladstone's sense of 
justice and fair play. Feuchtwanger sees Gladstone's 
disestablishment bill as an act of atonement for past 
10 wrongs done to Ireland. Peter Stansky has focused on 
Gladstone's changing religious beliefs. Stansky feels that 
Gladstone's actions were intended to strengthen the Church 
of Ireland: 
• • • in Ireland the establishment was very much a 
minority church, financially supported under duress 
by a people of a different and antagonistic faith. 
In such a situation, Gladstone believed that the 
Church of Ireland would be helping itself to fi~~ 
strength and new life through disestablishment. 
Although Stansky focuses on a different theme than 
Feuchtwanger, Stansky essentially agrees with Feuchtwanger 
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when he states that Gladstone's appeal "rested on the use of 
politics for moral ends." 12 
These books, by their omission of the Fenians, have 
implied that the Fenians played an insignificant role. 
J. C. Beckett is more direct in his negative assessment of 
the role of the Fenians in Gladstone's decision to promote 
disestablishment in 1868: 
It is an error to suppose that it was Fenianism 
that disposed the British public to accept the 
remedial 1~easures that he was shortly to put forward. 
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While other historians have discussed the influence of 
the Fenians, they do not give them much credit in their 
discussions. Gladstone's two most well known biographers, 
John Morley and Philip Magnus, indicate that the Fenians 
played some role in convincing Gladstone that the time for 
action was near. Morley leaves the reader with the 
impression that Gladstone was waiting for public opinion to 
ripen on the question of disestablishment. Gladstone's 
ability to feel the pulse and tempo of British public 
opinion was proven correct "by the result." 14 Magnus, for 
his part, comments that "two bomb outrages perpetrated in 
England by Irish Fenian conspirators in September and 
December, 1867, had impressed Gladstone without unduly 
influencing him. 1115 Neither Magnus nor Morley give the 
Fenians enough credit for their role in the debate on the 
urgency of disestablishment. 
Histories of both England and Ireland contain passages 
that briefly note the importance of the Fenians. Donald 
Read in his history of England states" .•• Gladstone 
regarded the Fenian outrages not as a reason for pursuing a 
course of negation in Ireland, but for promoting a policy 
which would seek to remove the grievances exploited by the 
Fenians." 16 Patrick O'Farrell notes that the violence of 
the Fenians "prompted the English government to make 
reforms which moderates had proposed earlier as essential 
in order to avoid violence." 17 
E. L. Woodward is more cautious, and more 
contradictory, in his approach toward the issue of the 
8 
influence of the Fenians. Woodward states that "Gladstone's 
mind was made up even before Fenianism shewed the danger of 
delay; in 1868 he told Granville that, for years past, he 
had been watching the sky with a strong sense of obligation 
to act with the first streak of dawn." 18 Yet, later in his 
book, he seems to emphasize the importance of the Fenians: 
Ireland was still unreconciled to English rule, 
but the failure of the leaders to obtain anything 
like the support which O'Connell had secured a 
generation earlier showed that, perhaps, Ireland 
was not irreconcilable. The redress of agrarian 
grievances, and the abolition of the privileges 
of the Anglican Church, might even yet bring about 
this long-delayed reconciliation. Such was the 
reasoning which persuaded Gladstone to take up the 
questions of Irish land tenure and the Irish Church. 
The Fenian movement ~glped to convince him that 
delay was dangerous. 
There are dangers involved in focusing on the Fenians 
and disestablishment. The first is that a study such as 
this tends to focus attention on a very narrow subject to 
the exclusion of other topics. Church disestablishment 
became only a part of a package of general reform that 
ultimately also included acts on land and education. The 
other problem is a danger that is pointed out by 
E. R. Norman: 
But too great an emphasis on the revolutionaries 
of this decade has led many historians into a 
disproportionate neglect of the other political 
movements which then ran their course. In fact, 
the most substantial political feature of the 
1860's was not the Fenians, but the emergence of a 
coherent Liberal party in Ireland2Bnder the direct patronage of the Catholic Church. 
While Norman may be correct in emphasizing other groups and 
organizations that were more important to long term Irish 
politics, this thesis attempts to understand the short term 
importance of the Fenians on Gladstone's decision to 
disestablish the Irish church. 
The issue of Fenianism, church disestablishment, 
Gladstone, and the connection between the three is clouded 
and unsure. That fact on its own speaks eloquently for the 
need of an in depth study. 21 Most of the sources already 
cited briefly address the issue of Gladstone and the 
Fenians. All the authors have their individual views of 
what the influence of one was upon the other. They do not, 
however, go into great detail. A study such as this would 
go a long way toward ending some of the confusion and 
contradiction. 
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The possible benefits of this study are numerous. The 
most obvious is the light it may throw on Gladstone's 
political nature. It will not produce any startling 
revelations about Gladstone's personality and politics. 
A limited study of one event in 1868-1869 cannot seriously 
challenge the detailed synthesis of the years of material 
that make up a biography. It can, however, support themes 
that have been emphasized in other works. The Fenians had 
an important role in convincing Gladstone to act upon the 
issue of disestablishment. This study confirms that 
Gladstone was capable of sudden, "volcanic" decisions to 
act upon his newly found convictions. As Philip Magnus 
maintains: 
Gladstone's iron self-mastery, which held his 
volcanic energy in check, was operated by his 
intelligence and by his will. He never gave 
himself to any subject, whatever attractions 
it held for him, until he had first convinced 
himself that the time was ripe for bringing it 
forward. He believed that his instinct for 
'right-timing', which his enemies called 
opportunism and greed for office, was his 
outstanding gift as a statesman. And the 
seismic way in which that instinct sometimes 
appeared to operate, was 2~ measure alike of the vehemence of his nature. 
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If the Fenians did force the English to consider Irish 
reforms, what, in part, would be the benefits of such 
reforms? Again, this question touches on Gladstone's 
concept of religion. Although he had come to the conclusion 
that the state did not necessarily have an obligation to 
determine religious truth, religion none the less played an 
important role in politics. Without a strong moral base 
on which society stabilizes, he thought society, political 
and civil, could disintegrate into anarchy. The Protestant 
church in Ireland had failed to find a following among the 
majority of the Irish. The Catholic church in Ireland had 
no real stake in insuring the stability of Irish society as 
long as there remained an officially established and 
sanctioned Church of Ireland. The Church of Ireland became 
an albatross around the neck of the civil authorities in 
Ireland. The Catholic church in Ireland would provide a 
stable and moral base for the continuance of English 
government in Ireland only after the destruction of the 
Church of Ireland had been accomplished. 
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What does this have to do with the Fenians? The 
Fenians themselves were not concerned with the religious 
question. The Fenians were primarily concerned with the 
establishment of an independent Irish republic. Why would 
Fenian violence influence Gladstone to attack the Church of 
Ireland? How could disestablishment, once enacted, affect 
the Fenians? Many Englishment, Gladstone included, felt 
that sympathy for the Fenians in Ireland was possible only 
because of outstanding grievances. English concern over the 
Fenian movement waxed and waned. At one moment the English 
were confident that repressive acts (such as the suspension 
of habeas corpus) could do the trick; while the next moment 
they became morbidly insecure and despondent when Fenian 
violence threatened to erupt, or when violence actually did 
erupt. Throughout the 1860s the English found themselves 
confident that the Fenian movement would disappear when 
their various projects failed (such as the attempted 
invasions of Canada). At other times in the 1860s the 
English found themselves outraged and puzzled by the 
continued violence of the Fenians--especially when that 
violence found its way onto English soil, as with the 
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incidents at Manchester and Clerkenwell. 
Of greater significance to English statesmen, was the 
effect that the Fenians had on the Irish. Most of the Irish 
were not active Fenians. The Fenians, however, fed off 
of the considerable sympathy the Irish were willing to give 
any movement willing to oppose the English. 23 The Catholic 
church, officially, was against all secret societies, 
including the Fenians. The Catholics, however, did not 
speak with one voice. Bishop McHale, Father Lavelle, and 
a large number of parish priests found it more desirable to 
either remain neutral or to show outright support for the 
Fenians. More significantly, the feeling of discontent 
illustrated by the Fenians helped the Irish tb focus their 
attention on issues tangential to the Fenian movement. 24 
As one proponent of the Irish reform put it: 
Though an organization may be ill-qesigned or 
even ridiculous, or, on account of the folly, 
or violence, or treachery, of those who are 
responsible for its management, may come to a 
speedy dissolution, if it have its origins in an 
earnest and enduring feeling, it is significant 
of danger--it represents more than is seen; 
and di~ d~wn as it may, it 2 ~s sure to spring up again in some new form. 
Disestablishment could mollify Ireland so that future groups 
such as the Fenians could not find fertile ground on which 
to grow. 
There are several other issues connected with the 
Fenian movement that this paper cannot, in more than a 
cursory manner, address. One is the ultimate consequence 
of the reality, or appearance, of English reform occurring 
only after the Irish had turned to violence. 26 This paper 
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will analyze whether or not Fenian violence was responsible, 
in large part, for convincing the English of the need for 
reform. This paper cannot, due to its limited scope, come 
to a satisfactory conclusion as to whether or not this 
canonised violence was the only means of bringing the 
English to the bargaining table. An answer to that 
question depends more upon Irish perceptions of what 
prompted the English to support reform than it does on 
the reality of what got the English to finally address 
Irish grievances. 
This paper attempts to provide some insights into the 
nature of British political reform, especially reform that 
affected Ireland. It is important to assess the influence 
of the Fenians on Gladstone. Gladstone, after 1868, became 
the champion of Irish reform, eventually embracing Home Rule 
in the 1880s. Gladstone, as the leader of the Liberal Party 
for much of the nineteenth century, was responsible for 
interpreting, and enacting, the desires of the English, the 
Irish, and, finally, the members of the Liberal Party. In 
what manner Gladstone approached the question of reform and 
under what conditions he felt it necessary to enact 
proposals for reform are important. 
The question is not, why did Gladstone believe in 
disestablishment? That is a separate topic. The question 
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is, why did he come to the conclusion in late 1867 that the 
time for disestablishment of the Irish church was at hand? 
How did the Fenian movement influence that decision? The 
evidence supports the contention that the Fenians played a 
significant role in Gladstone's decision to pursue the 
question of disestablishment. One intent of the 
disestablishment bill was to undercut potential popular 
support for the Fenians by granting reform that would 
satisfy the majority of the Irish, and defuse the Catholic 
clergy's rancorous invective and hatred of English 
governance. Gladstone hoped that once disestablishment 
had been enacted, along with reforms of land tenure and 
education, the Irish would be reconciled to English rule. 
Once the Irish were reconciled to English rule, movements 
like the Fenians would cease to pose any danger to the 
security and well being of the union between England and 
Ireland. 
15 
Notes 
1 The Liberals were returned with a majority of 112. 
2 See pages 66-68. 
3 The other two issues to be addressed were the 
questions of land tenure and state-supported education. 
4 The Irish Fenians formed an organization in 1858 
called the I.R.B. (the Irish Revolutionary, or Republican, 
Brotherhood). The Fenians were formed in 1859 in the 
United States. The British referred to both organizations 
as "Fenians." This paper will follow that practice, i.e. 
the term Fenians will refer to the Irish organization. 
The Fenians in the United States will be designated as such. 
5 See page 102. 
6 See pages 102-104. 
7 Peter Stansky. Gladstone. A Progress in Politics 
(New York: w. w. Norton, 1979) 42. 
8 Stansky 42-43. 
9 J. L. Hammond and M. R. D. Foot, Gladstone and 
Liberalism (London: English UP, 1966) 2. 
lO See E. J. Feuchtwanger, Democracy and Empire. 
Britain 1865-1914 (London: Edward Arnold, 1985). See also 
his biography, Gladstone (New York: St. Martin's Press, 
1975). 
11 Stansky 114. 
12 Stansky 119. 
13 J. c. Beckett, The Making of Modern Ireland, 
1603-1923 (New York: Knopf, 1966, 1969) 162. 
14 John Morley, The Life of William Ewart Gladstone 
(1903; New York: MacMillan Co., 1921) 250. 
15 Philip Magnus, Gladstone: A Biography (New York: 
E. P. Dutton, 1964) 196. 
16 Donald Read, England, 1868-1914: The Age of Urban 
Democracy (New York: Longman, 1979) 175. 
17 Patrick O'Farrell, Ireland's English Question 
(New York: Schocken Books, 1971) 97. 
18 Ernest L. Woodward, The Age of Reform (1938; 
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962) 182. 
19 Woodward 346. 
16 
20 E. R. Norman, A History of Modern Ireland (London: 
Allen & Unwin, 1971) 170. 
21 E. R. Norman, The Catholic Church and Ireland in 
the Age of Rebellion (Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1965). 
22 Magnus 76. 
23 In this case I am talking about the Catholic Irish, 
not the Protestant Irish. The majority of the Protestants 
in Ireland were Anglicans, and were quite happy with the 
religious settlement as it existed in Ireland. 
24 A good example is the National Association, created 
in response to the Fenians, but in which its members 
concerned themselves primarily with the questions of church, 
land, and education. See Norman, The Catholic Church, 
135-189. 
25 John F. Maguire, The Irish in America (1867; New 
York: Arno Press, 1969). 
26 This is the view of Patrick O'Connell, page 97. 
17 
CHAPTER I 
DISESTABLISHMENT PROPOSAL 
Introduction 
When Gladstone talked of "moving upon great questions 
of policy for Ireland" in 1869 1 he had in mind the questions 
of disestablishment, land reform, and education. These 
issues were not new. All of them had been enunciated as a 
concern sometime before 1868. 
The question of the correct relationship between the 
state and the Church of Ireland had been argu~d at least 
since 1839, when Lord John Russell steered a motion through 
Parliament that set up a committee to inquire into a system 
for better distribution of Church of Ireland funds. Russell 
hoped to take some of the money from the Church of Ireland 
and expend it on "secular" projects in Ireland. 
Gladstone had written his first book in 1837 on his 
conception of the true and correct relationship between the 
church and state. At that time he had defended the 
established church in Ireland. He claimed that the Church 
of Ireland was professing true religion, and in so doing it 
deserved the support and protection of the state. 
Gladstone's views changed quickly, however. As early as 
1845 Gladstone had stated that he could not consider himself 
loyal to the Church of Ireland as an established church 
any longer. Nor was this attitude unique to either the 
Conservatives or the Liberals. 2 Benjamin Disraeli claimed 
in 1844 that the Church of Ireland was "an alien church." 3 
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The critical question is not, when did Gladstone change his 
attitudes toward the established church in Ireland? The 
critical question is, why did Gladstone wait until 1868 to 
act upon his convictions? Why had his attitude toward the 
necessity of disestablishing the Irish church changed in 
late 1867? 
Despite condemnation of the Irish church by 
influential members of both parties, little or nothing was 
done. The potential problems associated with delay of long 
overdue reform was expressed in a warning in 1844 by the 
Member of Parliament for Buckinghamshire, Benjamin Disraeli. 
Disraeli described Ireland as a "dense population in extreme 
distress" who "inhabited an island where there was an 
Established Church which was not their Church," and who had 
"a territorial aristocracy, the richest of whom lived in 
distant capitals." Disraeli summed up the problems of the 
Irish: "they have a starving population, an absentee 
aristocracy, and an alien Church, and, in addition, the 
weakest Executive in the world." Disraeli finished his 
speech by posing a question, and answering it himself: 
Well, then, what would hon. Gentlemen say if they 
were reading of a country in that position? They 
would say at once, the remedy is revolution. But 
the Irish [can] not have a revolution; and why? 
Because Ireland [is] connected with another and more 
powerful country. Then what [is] the consequence? 
The connection with England thus became the cause 
of the present state of Ireland. If the connection 
with England prevented a revolution, and a 
revolution were the only remedy, England 
logically [is] in the odious position o~ being 
the cause of all the misery in Ireland. 
Although Disraeli's warning was not heeded, and no action 
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was taken on any of the problems that he had described, his 
question and analyses were resurrected 19 years later when 
the question of the position of the Church of Ireland was 
reopened by the member for Swansea, Lewis Dillwyn. 
Parliamentary Action And The Church of Ireland 
After years of sporadic efforts and talk, Parliament 
in the 1860s became the battleground where the issue of 
disestablishment was fought. How the issue came to be 
introduced, and its transformation from a request for a 
select committee to look into the question of Temporalities 
to a call for disestablishment, are critical to an 
understanding of the influences on Gladstone. Gladstone 
was Chancellor of the Exchequer in 1863, and was present 
during many of the debates. Indeed, he was involved in 
several of the debates, as we shall see. We need to turn to 
those debates: first, to see what the issues were, and, 
second, to see if and how they influenced Gladstone. Then 
it will be possible to evaluate the influence of the 
Fenians. 
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Dillwyn's Motion, 1863. Dillwyn's motion was, in 
comparison to later motions dealing with the Church of 
Ireland, timid and restrained. Dillwyn moved for a select 
committee to "inquire how far the present distribution of 
endowments for religious purposes throughout Ireland may be 
so amended as most to conduce to the welfare of all classes 
of Her Majesty's Irish Subjects. 115 Dillwyn explained that 
the reason he was bringing up the question in Parliament was 
due to its difficulty; he felt that only governmental action 
could secure the necessary reform. 6 
Dillwyn's speech, however, questioned more than the 
use of church endowments. Dillwyn claimed that the Church 
of Ireland could only be maintained for two r~asons: 
success of its mission in Ireland, or because of political 
necessity. Dillwyn felt that neither of these goals had 
been achieved. 
Dillwyn felt that the Church of Ireland was a source 
of English weakness. He claimed that it alienated the Irish 
members of Parliament, that it was an international 
embarrassment, and that it was a drain on the resources of 
England. 8 Furthermore, Dillwyn claimed, the Church of 
Ireland had failed as a missionary church. Dillwyn stated 
that in the province of Dublin, for instance, there had 
been 295,845 members of the Church of Ireland in 1844; in 
1861 that number had dropped to 236,519. 9 The Church of 
Ireland, according to Dillwyn, had no claim on the loyalty 
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of either the Irish or Parliament based solely on the 
merits of its success as either a church or as an instrument 
of the state. 
Dillwyn also doubted that the Church of Ireland could 
be maintained because of political necessity. Dillwyn felt 
that questions about the position of the Irish church were 
long overdue because of recent turbulence within Ireland--
turbulence that was mainly attributable to the existence of 
the Church of Ireland. 10 Discontent in Ireland could be 
overcome only if the English government would act quickly: 
In England ministers of religion of all 
denominations [are] the best allies of the 
Government in the preservation of order, and 
they [are] prominent in every movement for the 
promotion of education and prosperity of the 
people. But that [is] not the case in Ireland, 
because the Catholic priest [feels] himself 
aggrieved by the maintenance of the Church 
Establishment, and [can] not be expected to be 
an ally of1the Government in the preservation of order. 
Since Dillwyn's ultimate objectives went beyond the 
question of the use of religious endowments, why did he 
limit his motion to only that question? For one, Dillwyn 
realized that any motion that dealt with the official 
establishment of the Church of Ireland questioned the Act 
of Union that had created it. As Dillwyn noted, the Act of 
Union required that the Churches of England and Ireland be 
united. Dillwyn also noted, however, that the Act of Union 
did not prevent questioning of the use of endowments. 12 
Dillwyn's motion was a warning shot, a shot that was 
quickly turned into a protracted seige. 
The other reason for Dillwyn's timidity was his 
awareness that he was receiving little support from Irish 
Catholics or from the Irish M.P.'s. The Irish Catholics, 
for their part, were not yet organized. 13 Only after the 
National Association had been formed did Catholics in 
Ireland take up the cry of disestablishment in earnest. 14 
The Irish M.P.'s may have felt tha~ they could not discuss 
matters pertaining to the Irish church because of the oath 
they had taken to preserve and support the Union. 15 
Dillwyn had to proceed cautiously. For one, his 
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question touched upon the fundamental basis for the official 
relationship between England and Ireland: the Act of 
Union. Secondly, Dillwyn was unsure of his support, despite 
his claim that the Irish were unhappy with their present 
condition. 16 
Dillwyn's first motion is important for two reasons. 
First, because it put the issue before the House for the 
first time since 1859, 17 thereby forcing Parliament to 
think about an issue that had seemed dormant for a long 
time. With the advantage of hindsight, we now know that 
this was the first of several measures spanning the 1860s 
that eventually led up to the successful bill in 1869 that 
disestablished and partially disendowed the Irish church. 
Second, it is important because it introduced one of the 
critical arguments in favor of disestablishment: that 
unless there was a solid commitment for Irish reform, the 
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Irish could not be counted on to remain loyal to the union 
between England and Ireland. His statement that England 
needed a loyal Catholic clergy to help maintain order 
touched a responsive chord four years later in many 
Englishmen who were puzzled and perplexed by the phenomenon 
(as they saw it) of Fenianism. 
The debate on Dillwyn's motion was held May 19th and 
was indefinitely adjourned until Parliament was officially 
ended in July of that same year without any action being 
taken. Eighteen sixty-four proved to be a quiet year for 
Parliamentary action regarding the Church of Ireland. 
Parliamentary debate, however, was not quiet for long. 
Early in 1865 the issue was again brought before Parliament, 
again by Dillwyn. 
Dillwyn's Second Motion, 1865. On March 28, 1865, 
Dillwyn introduced a new measure which stated that "in the 
opinion of this House, the present position of the Irish 
Church Establishment is unsatisfactory, and (this house) 
calls for the early attention of Her Majesty's 
Government. 1118 This measure was much more strongly worded 
than the first. 
The issues that were brought out in the debate on 
Dillwyn's second motion closely paralleled the issues 
debated during the first motion. Dillwyn started the 
debate by stating that the revenues of the Irish church 
were 586,428 pounds per year, all of which went to a church 
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that ministered to 600,000 Anglicans. The majority of the 
Catholics, all 4.5 million, got nothing except for one tiny 
grant to the University of Maynooth. 19 The respective 
numbers of the different religions were cited again; the 
Church of Ireland existed only to minister to a minority 
population. 
Dillwyn realized that his motion could be construed as 
an attack on the Church of England: "Before entering on a 
discussion of the question," Dillwyn "wished to clear the 
issue from all irrelevant matter, and particularly to 
dispel one error--," that he had "brought the subject 
forward as an enemy of the Established Church in England. 1120 
Dillwyn argued that the foundations of the two churches 
were completely different. The Church of England rested 
on, and was supported by, the good will of the English 
people. In that sense the Church of England was a popular 
church. Dillwyn noted, conversely, that the Irish church 
"rested on a totally different foundation," and that if it 
were to rest solely on the good will and consent of the 
people of Ireland it would collapse at once. 21 The Irish 
church rested solely, as far as Dillwyn was concerned, on 
"power" and "bayonets." 22 
Dillwyn and his supporters proceeded to examine the 
mission of the Church of Ireland. There were, they said, 
two possible missions. One, that the Church of Ireland 
was a national church: a church established to serve the 
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citizens of the country. Dillwyn declared that the 
definition of an "established church is one that of an 
establishment by the general consent of the community for 
the administration of religion." 23 As a national church it 
was a complete failure. The statistics gave the lie to the 
Church of Ireland as a national church. As Grant Duff 
noted, it was the: 
Church of the great landowners, the bankers, the 
merchants. It is, so far as I know, the only 
church in Christendom of which it has been truly 
said that it takes for its motto~ 4
1 I fill the rich, 
and the poor I send empty away.' 
The proponents of the measure, as they had in 1863, 
derided the notion that the Church of Ireland had succeeded 
. . h h 25 as a missionary c urc • Grant Duff, in fact, argued just 
the opposite. Duff claimed that the Church of Ireland had 
"created about 4 1/2 millions of the most determined 
Catholics in the world." 26 
If the Irish church had failed in its official 
mission, was there any other reason for maintaining its 
ascendancy? Perhaps the Irish church could be maintained as 
a political bulwark of the English government in Ireland. 
As in 1863, this possible explanation for the Church of 
Ireland's existence encountered derision from those who 
would see its destruction. Far from being a source of 
stability, the Irish church was condemned as a source of 
weakness and dissension. Grant Duff, in explaining why 
Irish Catholics seemed so aggressive in comparison with 
their co-religionists in France and Spain, opined that "it 
is simply because the sagacity of English statesmen took 
care that, even after the penal laws were abolished, there 
should remain one grievance, which would fulfil the 
proverbial functions of a moderate persecution in 
stimulating religious zeal. 1127 Dillwyn claimed that "it 
might be said that it [the Irish church] was instituted in 
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order to obtain influence over the people of a country, and 
so to facilitate government; but if it had failed in 
converting the people, it must necessarily prove not an 
assistance but a serious impediment in the way of 
administration. 1128 Nor was the administration of Ireland 
all that was at stake. If Irish grievances were allowed to 
continue, the very integrity of Parliament would be at 
stake: 
He [the O'Donoghue] did not, however, hesitate 
to say that the effect of so persistent a refusal 
to redress a crying and acknowledged grievance had 
been to impress the great mass of people of Ireland 
with the idea that there was no reliance to be 
placed on the action of Parliament, and to cause 
them to regard with suspicion the man who told 
them that they ought to have every confidence in 
the wisdom and justice of the House of Commons. 
And when the House reflected on the length of time 
during which the question of the Irish Church 
Establishment had been under the notice of the 
Legislature, without any remedy being provided, 
they must, he thought, admit that it was not 
unnatural the P2~ple of Ireland would come to 
the conclusion. 
The delays in granting a solution to the problem of the 
Irish church could only encourage the Irish to find 
extra-parliamentary methods of attaining satisfaction. 30 
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The proponents of the measure also addressed the 
question of what effect a revision of the status of the 
Church of Ireland would have upon the Act of Union. Grant 
Duff pointed out that a Tory government had already 
weakened the act when they had amended the fourth article. 31 
Duff was amused by the concern shown about preserving the 
Act of Union against any more changes: 
This exaggerated veneration for the Irish Union 
sounds strange in the ears of a Scotchman when he 
remembers how the Scottish Union fared. How? Is 
it possible to maintain that the temporalities of 
the Irish Church were considered more sacred at the 
time of the union with Ireland than the heritable 
jurisdictions at the time of the union with 
Scotland? And did not the heritable jurisdictions 
go the same road 3~at we hope to see the Irish 
Establishment go? 
Duff clearly felt that Parliament, for no good reason, was 
being very selective about how they viewed the inviolability 
of Acts of Union. 
The issue of the Irish church was admittedly delicate 
and difficult. The O'Donoghue noted "that the maintenance 
of the Established Church in Ireland in its present 
condition had already been discussed with all the force, 
eloquence, wit, and logic which could be brought to bear 
upon it, and all to no purpose. 1133 Arguments were made, 
echoing sentiments voiced in 1863, that the Irish, the 
international community, and inflential members of English 
government had all voiced dissatisfaction with the Church of 
Ireland. 34 The issue, according to the proponents of the 
motion, was pressing. An answer was needed urgently. The 
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O'Donoghue, who had risen to second Dillwyn's motion, ended 
his speech with an impassioned plea: 
It was of the utmost importance to know what 
course Her Majesty's government intended to 
take on the present occasion--the noble Lord 
at the head of the government (Viscount Palmerston), 
the right hon. Gentleman and the Home Secretary (Sir 
George Grey), and the Secretary of State for the 
Colonies (Mr. Cardwell) having, in published 
speeches, given their adhesion in every essential 
particular to the first part of the Mo3~on of the 
hon. Member for Swansea (Mr. Dillwyn). 
If they agreed with t~5 first portion how could 
they reject the latter? 
If they opposed it, he was anxious to hear what 
reasons they would give. If they said the time was 
not come for action, he would ask them was the time 
not always come for acting with justice. He hopes 
Her Majesty's Government upon the present occasion 
would show that they were not afraid to take a just 
course. If they acted in the spirit which had 
dictated their speeches, he was certain that not only 
would they have a large gathering in that House, 
but their vote would commend itself to the great 
majority of the Irish people, and also to large 
numbers of persons in England. A vigorous, just, 
and prompt course taken at this particular moment 
would have a most beneficial effect, not only upon 
the State of Ireland, bu3 7perhaps, upon the future prospects of the Empire. 
Arguments made in favor of action were to no avail. 
Sir George Grey, speaking for the Liberal government, 
refused to be drawn into the quagmire that was the question 
of the condition of the Church of Ireland. Grey admitted 
that, "If, as a mere abstract question, I were asked to say 
that the present position of the Irish Church is not 
satisfactory, I should probably not differ much from the 
hon. Gentleman." 38 Grey, however, felt that more evil than 
good would be accomplished by questioning the status of 
to the Irish Church. 39 Grey closed his speech by stating: 
I am not surprised at the discontent existing 
from the cause I have mentioned, and I should be 
glad to redress it. But it is impossible to do 
without producing evils of far greater magnitude 
than those which now exist, and without involving 
in dissensions which would be totally destructive 
of peace and progress. For these reasons, 
believing that the subject advowed by those 
who have brought forward the Resolution is one 
which could not be attained without great 
mischief, being of opinion that no practical 
grievance exists, and that in attempting to 
redress the theoretical grievance, a great 
shock would be given to our laws and institutions, 
I can have no hesitation on the pa~0 of the Government in opposing the motion. 
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What sort of mischief was Grey afraid of? Dillwyn and 
Duff both stated that the measure was intended as an inquiry 
only; no follow-up action or legislation was mandated. 41 
Yet once the government undertook an official inquiry, how 
could they not act upon their discoveries? Especially, 
as The O'Donoghue had so impertinently pointed out, many of 
the highest members of government had expressed dissatisf ac-
tion with the Church of Ireland. The government sought to 
avoid the whole problem by claiming that no real grievance 
existed. 
But what if a real grievance had existed? What if the 
government was forced into action? What had Grey meant when 
he had talked of a "great shock" to England's "laws and 
institutions?" What if the government had gone ahead with 
an inquiry? The results of that inquiry were almost 
predictable: the present condition of the established 
Church of Ireland was unsatisfactory. What action would 
be taken? Sir George Grey had declared himself in favor 
42 of concurrent endowment. Concurrent endowment, however, 
was not what Dillwyn and his supporters had in mind. They 
had already stated that the established Church of Ireland 
was a festering wound that poisoned and enraged the minds 
of Irish Catholics. Grant Duff condensed 300 years of 
English miscues and misrule into one succinct statement: 
During the last 300 years, you have had three 
policies in Ireland. From Queen Elizabeth to 
William III, there was a policy of persecutions--
that failed. From William III down to Catholic 
Emancipation, there was a policy of ascendency--
that failed too. Then timidly and tentatively 
you turned toward general endowment, and in 1845 
Sir Robert Peel took a considerable step in that 
direction. It soon became clear, however, 
that the c~~ntry would not follow you on that 
road • • • 
The time for concurrent endowment had come and gone. That 
left only disestablishment. 
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Debate was adjourned until May 2nd. On April 28th, in 
response to a question from Walpole, Dillwyn stated that he 
was not ready to continue with the question on the 2nd. 44 
On May 12th, in response to a query by Dillwyn, Sir George 
Grey said that the calendar for the rest of the parliamen-
tary session was too full, and that there was not time 
enough to address the issue. The debate in Parliament on 
the Irish church was finished for 1865. 
Gray's Motion, 1866. Many members of Parliament could 
not have been too shocked when, on April 10, 1866, Sir John 
Gray reintroduced discussion of the Irish church. Nor, by 
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this time, would there have been surprise at Gray's 
admonition that he spoke the sentiments "of those who act 
with me, when I say that we are fully determined never to 
let this question rest until Church ascendancy is abolished, 
and until perfect religious equality is established in 
Ireland. 1145 The language of the new motion was stronger 
than the language of the 1865 motion (just as the language 
of the 1865 motion was stronger than that of the 1863 
motion). Gray moved "that the position of the Established 
Church in Ireland is a just cause of dissatisfaction to the 
people of that country, and urgently demands the 
consideration of parliament. 1146 The debate on the Church 
of Ireland had been reopened. 
Gray condemned the Church of Ireland with very severe 
language. Gray claimed that the only "pretence" upon which 
the Irish church could be defended was that it was: 
• an old wrong, and old injustice, and old 
abuse, [that] has continued for so lengthened a 
period that there would be serious difficulty in 
removing that grievance ••• that there [are], in 
fact, certain established rights of injustice, and 
that these rights of injustice must be preserved
47 and conserved because of their long continuance. 
Gray went on to explain that "everyman in Ireland," except 
those people who were intimately connected with the Church 
itself, "admits that the Established Church of Ireland has 
failed most signally, failed as to every one of the purposes 
for which it was imported into that country. 1148 Gray 
finished his statements of general condemnation, and said 
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that, since this Parliament had seen so many new members, 
he would repeat some of the facts that had been used in the 
earlier debates. 49 
Gray and the other proponents proceeded to reiterate 
many of the same themes that had been stressed in earlier 
debates. The 1861 census was again quoted. Gray and 
Mr. Pollard-Urquhart, using those statistics, claimed that 
the Church of Ireland had failed as a missionary church. 
In short, none of the old complaints had disappeared.so 
Neither had the argument disappeared that the Irish 
church was disruptive to the civil peace of Ireland. 51 
Gray asked if Ireland and the Irish should be happy and 
equal citizens in Great Britain, or: 
••• shall we have a great surging mass of 
discontent created, fostered, and rendered active 
by the continuance of unequal laws--of laws which, 
if they do not actually injure the person, affect 
the social position and the future progress in life 
by putting the brand of degradation and of 
inferiority upon one class, and givig~ an odious 
and hateful ascendancy to the other. 
Colonel Greville, who seconded the motion, invited the House 
to "assist in removing a cause of calamity to Ireland and 
the constant source of its disaffection." Colonel Greville 
further added that "might it not be said of England and 
Ireland ••• that the nations are two, because the Churches 
are one?" 53 Disaffection of the Irish was still a major 
issue in the discussions on the Church of Ireland. Other 
issues, however, came to the fore as well. 
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In this debate the proponents of the measure spent 
much more time answering the criticisms of the Conserva-
tives. One argument that the Conservatives useds 4 was that 
in reality the Church of Ireland was the true heir to the 
Catholic Church of St. Patrick. The O'Donoghue answered 
by claiming that it did not matter in the least whether or 
not st. Patrick had been a Protestant. What mattered was 
that the vast majority of the Irish were still Catholic and 
that they had never "embraced" the Protestant religion.SS 
Colonel Greville argued, in response to Conservative 
concerns that disestablishment would affect the Act of 
Union, that the Parliament had already "fiddled with the 
Act." The first time was in 1833 when they stippressed 
10 bishoprics and 2 archbishoprics; the second in 1834 when 
Parliament suspended "numerous dignities and benefices;" 
and the third time in 1838 when Parliament "extinguished" 
2S% of the tithes.s 6 
The supporters of the measure also made use of a new 
argument. Colonel Greville argued that disestablishment had 
been tried, with success, in Canada. Canada had, according 
to Greville, disestablished the state church for the sake of 
"social harmony."s 7 If Parliament could give control of the 
church to the Canadians, who promptly disestablished it, why 
could not Parliament disestablish the Irish church? 
Dillwyn's motions had been very tentative steps 
toward disestablishment. As the debates continued and more 
35 
thought was given to what to do with the church once it was 
disestablished, some small differences appeared among the 
proponents of the measure. Sir John Gray and The O'Donoghue 
were for complete disendowment. The O'Donoghue claimed 
that the clergy would not accept church endowment and that 
the ecclesiastical revenues were the property of the Irish 
t
. 58 na ion. Colonel Greville on the other hand argued that 
for political reasons it was impossible for the Catholics 
to accept money from the State: 
They would lose caste if they did. It would 
diminish their influence with the people and it 
would be a misfortune if their influence were lost; 
because, when the Irish people cease to have respect 
for the authority of religion it will not be long 59 before they throw off the authority of the State. 
Mr. Pollard-Urquhart agreed that the clergy would not, or 
could not, accept state money, but he wondered if the money 
could not be spent in part in increased grants to Maynooth 
and to the Regium Donum. 60 Whatever differences may have 
appeared between some of the supporters of the measure, 
they were all in agreement that resolution of those 
differences could wait. The issue was complicated, but what 
was more important was "the right to worship God according 
to their consciences, and the right of being perfectly free 
and unfettered because of religious opinion." 61 
The proponents of the measure were to be disappointed 
again. Chichester Fortescue, speaking for the government, 
claimed that: 
••• few will blame them [the government], 
because I think few will maintain that public 
opinion has attained so clear and so ripe a state 
on this subject as would enable the Government to 
know, first of all, what is possible, in the next 
place, what would be most acceptable to those who 
are most interested in the matter--namely, the people 
of Ireland, and es~2cially the Roman Catholic 
people of Ireland. 
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Fortescue also claimed that the resolution would not be one 
of discussion, but would compel immediate action on the part 
of the Government. 63 Fortescue did say, no doubt knowing 
he was engaging in a fantasy, that he hoped that the Church 
of Ireland would voluntarily give up some of its 
endowments--not to be given to the priests, but to be given 
to "some body fairly representing the Roman Catholic Church 
as a whole. 1164 
The supporters of Gray's motion did not go away 
completely empty-handed. Fortescue did make statements in 
favor of their motion that were much stronger in their 
support than past statements had been. Fortescue started 
out by saying that he confessed that he approached the 
"resolution personally with feelings of sympathy and 
concurrence. 1165 He further admitted that: 
If it does not now press hardly in its daily 
effects upon the peasantry and fairness of the 
country, yet (it now) influences and colours 
every subject of public discussion, and most 
deeply affects the minds of the most educ~6ed 
and intelligent portion of the community. 
Fortescue further refused to acknowledge that any of the 
arguments that the Conservatives had in defence of the 
Church of Ireland were valid. Fortescue claimed that the 
arguments which "support and justify the existence of the 
Established Church in England condemn the existence of the 
Established Church in Ireland." 67 Fortescue ended his 
speech by admitting that he did not know when the time for 
action would come, but that he wished "it well," and that 
he wished it "God speed." 68 
Despite Fortescue's encouraging tone, the supporters 
37 
of the motion were not entirely pleased. They had hoped for 
some sort of tangible government support, and all they had 
received in return were words of potential support for 
sometime in the unforeseen future. Mr. Pollard-Urquhart, 
who followed Fortescue in speaking, allowed his bitterness 
over the Government's refusal to back the motion to show: 
The right hon. Gentleman has said, indeed, that 
public opinion is not sufficiently ripe to enable 
any Government to take it in hand (the issue of 
Church disestablishment). Why, Sir, what progress 
could our legislation ever make if Government were 
never to deal with any ques6~on till they thought 
public opinion ripe for it? 
Pollard-Urquhart went on to remind the Liberals that the 
Whigs had backed free-trade even when there was no public 
support, losing office in consequence in 1841. Yet the 
Whigs had been vindicated seven years later in 1848 when 
they were re-elected on a free-trade platform. The 
Government benches remained quiet for the rest of the 
debate. 
Gray's Second Motion, 1867. On the 7th of May, 1867, 
Sir John Gray brought to the floor of Parliament another 
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motion with respect to the Irish church. His motion asked 
"that this House will, on Wednesday the 29th day of this 
instant May, resolve itself into a committee to consider 
the Temporalities and Priviledges of the Established Church 
in Ireland." 70 Sir John was not overly hopeful, however, 
that the issue would find favor with either party: 
It would seem as if the leaders at both sides of 
the House [shrank] from dealing with this question, 
which is, no doubt, one of peculiar difficulty--it 
would seem as if they [are] anxious to avoid dealing 
with it at all ••• The leaders on the other side 
of the House do not feel disposed to take it up, 
possibly because they feel that they are too short 
a time in office. The leaders upon this side of 
the House do not seem disposed to take it up 
~ecause ~h~y f711 that they are too short a time 
in opposition. 
Gray hoped, however, that the House would look favorably 
upon his motion and go into a committee--not to endorse 
any particular course of action--but to come to grips with 
the problem of a Protestant church forced onto a 
predominantly Catholic nation. 72 
The arguments used against the Church of Ireland were 
those of the previous debates. The proponents of the 
measure concentrated a goodly bulk of their attention on the 
political ramifications of the establishment. Mr. Murphy 
argued that the Church of Ireland had been established for 
political, rather than religious reasons. 73 Sir John 
claimed that the Irish church was a chief grievance of the 
Irish. Gray further attacked the members of Parliament for 
dragging their feet. He pointed out that Earl Russell had 
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only half-heartedly addressed the issue of the Irish church 
at a time of serious Irish discontent. 74 Gray asked 
Parliament if they wished church disestablishment to be 
carried in the same way that the issue of Catholic 
emancipation had been resolved: 
Do the leaders mean to intimate to us who sit 
below the gangway that we are to get up an agitation 
somewhat analogous to the angry agita7~on which 
carried Catholic Emancipation • • • ? 
Beyond asking what it would take to move the leaders 
of the two parties to address the issue of the Irish church, 
the proponents of the motion gave dire predictions of what 
would happen if the Irish church was left alone. Sir John 
Gray quoted Sir George Lewis "in one of his most recently 
edited publications:" 
No improvements in the material economy of the 
Established church, in the distribution of the 
revenues, or the discipline of its clergy, tend 
to lessen the sense of grievance arising from 
this source, the objection if on principle, not 
of degree, and nothing short of perfect equality 
in the treatment of all religious sects will 
satisfy the person whose discontentment springs from 
this source. The effect of the reference in 
question is that the whole body of the Roman 
Catholics in Ireland are more or less alienated 
from the Government, the author of their wrong, 
and filled with jealousy ~gd ill will toward the 
more favored Protestants. 
Colonel Greville, who seconded the motion, claimed that "it 
was the existence of this grievance and others that gave 
discontented agitators their influence over the people of 
Ireland, and if it were not for them their agitation would 
be without effect." 77 
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Influential Liberals were coming ever closer to being 
in agreement with the radicals and non-conformists who 
favored the immediate disestablishment of the Irish church. 
Chichester Fortescue claimed that "every argument put 
forward in support of the Establishment here amounted to a 
condemnation of it there." 78 Fortescue agreed with the 
proponents of the measure that the existence of the 
established church was a cause of Irish discontent. 
Fortescue said, on the issue of discontent and the 
established church, "I believe that until the ascendancy 
which at present exists in that respect is done away with, 
we shall not have peace, contentment, or prosperity in the 
1 d "79 an • 
Despite words of encouragement, Fortescue and other 
Liberals did not feel that they could support the measure 
as a party. As serious as the discontent was, it was not 
nearly as bad as Irish discontent had been in the past. 
Fortescue claimed that the Fenian movement was not as 
"injurious" nor as bad as the "civil and religious war of 
1798," nor was the discontent as bad as the state of 
Ireland 30 years before the current debate when, 
••• the savage conflict took place at 
Carrickshock and Rathcormac. As compared with 
the state of feelings which existed at those 
periods, the House [can] look with satisfaction 
at the support received by the Executive from the 
middle and upper classes during the Fenian 
disturbances. It [is] impossible to look at 
these things without recognizing that the policy 
of justice and wisdom on which the House entered 
a few years ago had borne fruit, and that its 
results ought to encouB3ge Parliament to proceed 
in the same direction. 
Calm, deliberate consideration was the order of the day. 
Fortescue argued, in agreement with Gladstone, 81 that the 
issue had not reached a stage at which it could be dealt 
with: 
••• though its vast and pressing importance was 
becoming everyday much clearer to the mind of this 
country. The circumstances of Ireland, the 
intolerable and continued presence of sedition 
and disaffection in that country [calls] for §2 conscientious examination by Parliament • • • 
Fortescue said that he would "hail the day when they could 
arrive at a settlement of this question." 83 Fortescue, 
however, admitted that that day had not yet arrived and 
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that the best he could do was give his assent to the motion 
. t b 84 as a pr1va e mem er. The proponents of the measure had 
come extremely close to getting some sort of official 
recognition for it. Yet prominent Liberals, when it came 
time to declare their intentions, backed away from 
wholehearted support for disestablishment. They were 
willing to support an inquiry into the subject--but only 
as individuals, not as a party. 
The proponents of disestablishment had used several 
arguments in favor of their motions. They had argued that 
the great majority of the Irish were not Anglicans, but 
rather that they were Catholics, and they had argued that 
the Church of Ireland had failed in its mission as a 
missionary church. More importantly, the proponents of 
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disestablishment had stated that the Church of Ireland was 
a primary cause of Irish discontent. Further, they pointed 
out that Irish discontent was a threat to the legislative 
union between the two countries. The leaders of the 
Liberal Party had concurred with almost all the arguments 
made against the Irish church. The leaders of the Liberal 
Party, however, did not agree that Ireland was as 
discontented as the proponents of disestablishment claimed. 
The Liberal Party refused to take up the cause of 
disestablishment because they felt that the condition of 
Ireland did not warrant their addressing an issue that was 
so complicated and volatile. It was obvious that support 
of the Liberal Party could be had only if Ireland showed 
signs of pervasive discontent. 
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CHAPTER II 
THE UNSYMPATHETIC REACTION: THE CONSERVATIVES 
Dillwyn's motion in 1863 met with little sympathy from 
either the Liberals or the Conservatives. As long as the 
Liberals were in power they did little to help along any 
schemes that involved revision of the status of the Church 
of Ireland. The Liberals did not, however, deny that the 
current position of the Church of Ireland was unsatisfactory. 
They simply did not want to involve themselves in a problem 
that had caused the downfall of several ministries. 1 
Nor were all Conservatives pleased with the 
relationship between England and the Church of Ireland. 
Disraeli, in his speech before Parliament in 1845, 2 had 
claimed that the existence of an "alien church," along with 
the problems of absentee landlords and chronic poverty, 
were justifications for a revolution. 
Other Conservatives were unhappy with the Church of 
Ireland as well. In 1853 Lord Stanley wrote a pamphlet on 
the church rate question. In his diary he noted: 
I inserted, tentatively, some passages adverse to 
the general principle of Establishment of a 
ecclesiastical kind: but confined this to theory, 
though it may be that a practical apglication to 
the Irish Church is not far distant. 
Two weeks later, Lord Stanley again noted his lack of 
satisfaction: 
Moore brought on the subject of the Irish Church: 
Lord John strongly opposed all inquiry, or attempt 
at change: I did not vote, the permanent maintenance 
of the Irish Establishment cannot be defended: but 
it is reasonable and expedient to wait until the 
cessation of emigration shall have settled the 
relati¥e numerical strength of the two creeds and 
races. 
Lord Stanley's hope that the problem would resolve itself 
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was altogether too sanguine. Nine years later the question 
of the relationship between England and the Church of 
Ireland was again making itself felt: 
(Talk) with Sir G. Lewis, chiefly on points of 
history, not much of present affairs: the only 
thing he said bearing on live politics was that 
in his eyes the real difficulty of the day was 
the Irish Church. While it remained there 
appeared no chance of the Catholics being 
satisfied, yet to reduce would do no good, and 
to abolish it wholly would be impossible, the 
country not being ripe for the voluntary 
system, and the middle classes looking on the 
Irish Church in particular as the def5nce of 
Protestantism. In all this I assent. 
Nine months later the issue was tentatively introduced by 
Dillwyn. 
Lord Stanley's statements are intriguing. They show 
the general reticence felt in dealing with Irish affairs; 
the hope that, if enough time went by, the changing 
circumstances would solve the problems. In this case 
Stanley hoped that emigration would eventually solve the 
problem of having an officially established Protestant 
church in a land that was predominantly Catholic. 
Lord Stanley, however, was not representative of the 
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Conservative Party; he was very close to the Whigs in 
sentiment. He noted in 1864 that he felt there was little 
difference between Conservatives and moderate Whigs. 6 
Whatever qualms he may have had about the Church of Ireland, 
others were quick to defend its existence. When Dillwyn 
introduced his first motion, it was the Conservatives who 
most strongly opposed it. 
Dillwyn's First Motion - 1863 
The job of defending the Irish church fell on the 
shoulders of James Whiteside, M.P. for the University of 
Dublin. Whiteside opened his attack by questioning the 
motives of those who were behind the motion (despite 
Dillwyn's claims that he had no ulterior motives). 
Whiteside was convinced that this attack on the Church 
of Ireland was really a preliminary move against the 
Church of England. Whiteside claimed that the "hon. 
Gentleman" had made "a political reputation by nibbling 
7 at the Church of England." 
Whiteside further attacked the measure because of what 
he considered its faulty attempt at mollifying Irish 
opinion. He doubted that the Irish were that dissatisfied: 
"I believe that Irishmen are much less discontented and less 
quarrelsome than people generally in this country imagine." 8 
In fact, Whiteside was amazed, given Dillwyn's statement 
about Catholic unrest, that he had heard nothing from the 
Catholic M.P.'s. Whiteside claimed that "it is a remarkable 
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fact that his motion is not brought forward or suggested as 
far as I am aware, by the Roman Catholic Members of this 
House." 9 
Whiteside also attacked the question of the relative 
strengths of the various denominations. Whiteside first 
claimed that the number of Protestant churches in Ireland 
10 had grown. He further wanted to know the source of 
Dillwyn's statistics. Whiteside could not question the 
results of the 1861 census, but he could, and did, question 
the statistics for 1834 (with which Dillwyn compared the 
Church in 1861), since there was no census in 1834. 
Whiteside questioned the source and veracity of Dillwyn's 
. f . 11 in ormat1on. Whiteside, however, knew that the 1861 
census figures in themselves were damning, and tried to 
belittle their importance by claiming that he agreed "with 
Burke that it will be a bad day for mankind when great 
principles come to be decided by numerical majorities." 12 
Whiteside attacked the measure because of its possible 
effects on the Union, and that "the very fact that the 
Church in Ireland has existed for centuries, and that it is 
incorporated in the Constitution of the country, is a 
powerful argument in favor of its preservation." 13 This 
argument was one which, in time, became the Conservatives 
strongest argument against disestablishment. 
Whiteside 1 s major argument, however, was that the 
Church of Ireland represented "true" religion. 14 On this 
issue Whiteside felt he had his most telling point: an 
attack on the Church of Ireland was an attack on the 
accomplishments of the Reformation: 
But I will add, because I do not wish to conceal 
it, that it is mainly to be defended because it is 
connected with the Reformation. It burst the 
fetters that enchained the human mind. It taught 
people to think, and shook the powers of darkness 
and of evil; from that moment the Church of 
Ireland has held up the lamp of truth. It may 15 have been obscured, but has never been quenched. 
Despite the lack of action in 1864, Lord Stanley did 
note that the issue had not gone away. When he went into 
the smoking room in the House of Commons, he: 
••• found Bright, declaiming, as is his custom, 
to a circle of friends: Ireland the subject: he 
said no good would be done until the estates were 
divided, tenant right given, the Irish Church 
done away, the revenues ~~rtly secularized, partly 
divided among all sects. 
Despite Bright's conviction that something had to be done, 
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no action was taken until 1865--the Conservatives had a year 
before they had to think about the issue of the Irish 
church. 
Dillwyn's Second Motion - 1865 
The Conservatives were more worried in 1865 than they 
had been in 1863. Rumors were drifting about that the Whig 
government was going to support Dillwyn in his efforts: 
There having been sidely circulated a report 
that ministers intended supporting Dillwyn's motion 
on the Irish Church, I asked Sir c. [Wood] if there 
wasn't any truth in it? He said, 'none,' that the 
subject had not even been seriously discussed, so 
far as he knew--that for himself he thought the 
Irish Establishment an abomination, and believed 
most public men did so, by~ to attempt to meddle 
with it would be madness. 
wood went on to reassure Stanley that "he was not aware of 
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any intention to support Dillwyn even indirectly. Certainly 
no joint action would be taken by the cabinet. 1118 This must 
have soothed some of the concerns that the Conservatives 
would have felt over a battle on the Church of Ireland. 
When the measure came up for debate, however, the 
Conservatives had one of their more capable members, 
Gathorne Hardy (later Lord Cranbrook), speak against it. 
Hardy started out in much the same vein as Whiteside had 
in 1863 and claimed that disestablishment of the Church 
19 of England was the real goal. 
Hardy catalogued the defects of the measure--some of 
which repeated arguments made by Whiteside in 1863. Hardy 
doubted that the Irish were that discontented: "The hon. 
Member for Swansea speaks of the Church of Ireland as being 
propped up by bayonets. Surely that is a fiction which 
can hardly exist even in the mind of the hon. Gentleman. 1120 
Hardy even went so far as to claim that the Irish peasantry 
looked upon the Protestant pastors as their friends. 21 
Hardy, however, was not so foolhardy as to say that 
there was no discontent in Ireland at all. Hardy felt that 
the discontent in Ireland existed mainly because of their 
impoverishment. Hardy could, for that reason, remark, "Is 
it [disestablishment] to bring peace? We have been told so 
before, but it is not by surrendering principles that you 
can bring peace." 22 
Unlike Whiteside, however, Hardy was more concerned 
with the effect that disestablishment would have upon the 
Act of Union. The Act of Union had been forged as an 
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inseparable bond between England and the Church of Ireland. 
"The Union, therefore, in reference to the Church was, it 
seems to me, one of the most solemn obligations that was 
ever entered into." 23 Hardy was not rigid in his religious 
views. If one of Britain's colonies did not want an 
established church, that was their right. Ireland, however, 
did not have that freedom: its church was established. 
Independence and freedom of action seem to me the 
right of the Colonial Churches which are not 
established, and they should only be limited with 
regard to the Church of England and Ireland so 
far as is absolutely necessary in consequence of 
her union with the State. That union must, to 
some extent, affect her liberty, but there is a 
large compensation in the continued recognition 
of a Nat~~nal religion, and its inestimable 
results. 
Hardy's statement did not preclude all reforms of the Irish 
church--as long as they were minimal. Hardy did not 
condone, however, an attack that threatened the existence 
of the church: an attack on the Church of Ireland, reasoned 
Hardy, was an attack on the union between England and 
Ireland. 
Gray's First Motion - 1866 
The Conservatives were no happier with the 1866 measure 
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than they had been with the motions of 1863 and 1865. 
Their attack on the 1866 motion closely resembled their 
attacks on the earlier motions. Mr. Whiteside claimed that 
the "important majority" of Ireland was Protestant and that 
to disestablish the Irish church would leave this majority 
without any important concessions--concessions tnat were 
necessary if Protestants were to continue to govern 
Ireland. 25 Mr. Whiteside further argued, as did Pell Dawson, 
that the Church of Ireland represented "true" religion. 26 
But to their defense of the Act of Union they now added the 
issue of property. Whiteside asked Parliament if they were 
"aware that when you are asked to disturb the Established 
Church in the possession of her property, you are asked to 
overthrow the Act of Settlement?" 27 
The Conservatives did not agree with the proponents 
of the measure that it was all that necessary. Further, 
they saw disestablishment as only the beginning of Catholic 
demands. The Conservatives queried when Catholic demands 
were going to stop. Whiteside quoted Lord Plunkett, who 
had promised that Catholics in Ireland would not attack the 
established church if they were granted emancipation. 28 
The Conservatives, in the person of Mr. Pell Dawson, even 
accused the Catholics of forging signatures on petitions 
against the established church, which, Dawson claimed, 
"were known to be in many instances in the same 
handwriting."
29 
Finally, the Conservatives doubted that 
\ 
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the Irish were all that dissatisfied. 30 The Conservatives 
argued that those Irish who were dissatisfied, the Fenians, 
were not concerned with the issue of the church 
establishment. Mr. Whiteside made the disingenuous argument 
that the Fenians did not attack the established church 
because the Fenians knew that the church "dealt fairly and 
equitably with her tenants." 31 
Gray's Second Motion - 1867 
The debate of 1867 was the fourth time that the Church 
of Ireland had been under attack in Parliament. The 
Conservatives, like the radicals and Liberals, were starting 
to sound like well-worn records. They claimed that the 
Church of Ireland was the true church, that an attack on the 
Church of Ireland was an attack on private property, and 
that the question was much too complicated an issue for 
Parliament to address. They even doubted that there was an 
ascendancy in Ireland. Sir Frederick Heygate stated that 
"as far as [I] can tell there [is] no ascendancy in 
Ireland." 32 The Conservatives denied that any problem 
existed--they came very close to denying that there was 
an established church in Ireland. 
By 1867 the Conservatives could no longer claim, 
however, that there was no discontent in Ireland. They 
belittled the idea that the Church of Ireland was a 
legitimate and serious grievance. Mr. Chatterton, the 
Attorney General for Ireland, claimed that it was only a 
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grievance (and a "sentimental" one at that) of the Catholic 
clergy and certain other agitators "who sought to make for 
themselves political capital." 33 Sir Frederick Heygate was 
more precise in his assessment of the problem of discontent: 
It (is] a mistake to imagine that the disturbances 
which had recently occurred in Ireland [have] for 
their origin religious grievances. It [has] been 
over and over again stated authoritatively that the 
Fenian movement has no connection with Religion, 
and ••• the Fenians themselves, as ~ 4body, [are] dead to all religious considerations. 
The Conservatives felt that the fact that Ireland was 
discontented was all the more reason to hold onto the 
established church: "It should not be forgotten that in 
all the disloyalty that [has] prevailed during the last two 
years not one member of the Church of Ireland [has] been 
suspected "35 The Conservatives did not believe that 
disestablishment could placate Irish discontent in the form 
of Fenianism. In fact, the Conservatives were loathe to 
destroy an establishment whose members were demonstrably 
loyal to the status quo in Ireland. 
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CHAPTER III 
"THE TIME IS NOT RIGHT": 
GLADSTONE'S REACTION TO EARLY DISESTABLISHMENT MOTIONS 
IN PARLIAMENT 
Gladstone introduced his motions to disestablish the 
Church of Ireland in 1868. Gladstone had had ample 
opportunity since 1863 to act on the disestablishment issue. 
At any point during that time he could have declared himself 
in favor of action; he could have pushed disestablishment to 
the forefront of parliamentary consideration in much the 
same way he had forced the Palmerston government to adopt a 
new parliamentary reform measure. The fact is, he did not 
do so. 
Of all the leading Liberals he was considered the one 
most likely to adopt disestablishment as an issue. In 1864 
he was reported to have had a conversation in which he 
called the Church of Ireland a "hideous blot" and he felt 
that it was one of two issues on which reform was possible. 1 
In 1865, Sir C. Wood told Lord Stanley that no support for 
Dillwyn's motion was planned, but that "he would be sorry to 
answer for what Gladstone might or might not say on any 
question (laughing)." 2 Precisely what Gladstone would or 
would not do was a complete unknown--Gladstone was a mystery 
to many of those around him. 3 Disraeli and Lord Stanley 
were not quite sure in 1866 what Gladstone was going to do 
on the question of Ireland, although they felt some action 
was imminent: 
He (Disraeli) hears that Gladstone has a 'sensation 
measure' ready, of what kind he does not know, but 
believes it to relate to Ireland: whether payment 
of priests, or reduction of Irish Church endowments, 
or some gr~at project of buying up the Irish 
railroads. 
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Long before Gladstone had made up his mind to promote action 
on disestablishment, those around him, especially 
Conservatives, felt that he was planning some sort of 
action. 
Despite expectations that he would do so sooner, 
Gladstone did not declare himself in favor of active reform 
for Ireland, including the question of the Church of Ireland, 
until late 1867. 5 Before we get to Gladstone's decision to 
act on the question of the Irish church, we must understand 
why in the preceding years he did not act upon his 
convictions. 
Dillwyn's First Motion - 1863 
Dillwyn's motion in 1863 was Gladstone's first 
parliamentary opportunity to declare his opinion on the 
condition of the Irish church. He felt that the whole 
question should be dropped. 6 Gladstone further claimed that 
"the business of the se~sion was ••• pressing," and that 
he did not "think there was such a general desire on the 
part of the House to proceed with the debate that the 
Government should give up the time at their disposal for 
7 that purpose." 
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John Maguire, evidently misunderstanding Gladstone's 
statement, felt that Gladstone was mistaken and that there 
was a very great desire on the part of Ireland for a 
solution to the problem. 8 Gladstone responded that he "did 
not presume to say whether or not there was a strong 
feeling in Ireland on the question, but only that there 
had been no general manifestation of a desire in the House 
for a debate on it. 119 
The proponents of the measure may have been 
disappointed, but, given the history of the issue, they 
could not have been too surprised. Gladstone's response 
was well in step with good solid Liberal/Whig thinking. He 
did not say that the measure was, in itself, wrong. He did 
not question the logic behind the measure. He simply stated 
that he felt that there was no general sentiment in the 
House of Commons to deal with the issue. He completely 
ignored the question of Temporalities. 
1864 
Gladstone, in 1864, called the Church of Ireland a 
"hideous blot", and went on to tell Enfield that he thought 
an inquiry was "unnecessary and a waste of time. 010 
Gladstone's remark to Enfield is much stronger in its 
condemnation of the Irish church than was his statement to 
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Parliament in 1863--he was prone to making strong comments. 
For example, in May of 1864, Gladstone, who was making a 
speech in favor of the extension of the franchise, commented 
that there was no reason in the world why every man should 
not be within the "pale" of the constitution. 11 This 
comment was taken to mean that Gladstone was advocating 
universal male suffrage. Gladstone, however, later said 
that he wasn't sure what all the commotion was about, and 
that it was not "a deliberate and studied announcement." 12 
In his conversation with Lord Enfield on the Church of 
Ireland he was also only voicing his opinion. Like his 
speech on parliamentary reform, his comments on the 
established church were neither deliberate nor studied. 
As future events were to show, Gladstone was not yet ready 
to undertake the disestablishment of the Irish church. 
Gladstone was giving vent to his dissatisfaction with the 
established church; he was not raising the cry of battle. 
Dillwyn's Second Motion - 1865 
Gladstone's speech on Dillwyn's second motion is 
among his more famous. John Morley, Gladstone's biographer, 
declared that with that speech "Mr. Gladstone made the 
first advance upon what was to be an important journey." 13 
Certainly, reviewed in retrospect, it was the beginning of 
Gladstone's concern with Irish reform and was a major step 
toward disestablishment, even if Gladstone was as yet 
unaware that he was embarking on a crusade that lasted the 
rest of his political life. 
Gladstone rose to speak immediately after Gathorne 
Hardy14 and stated that he found himself in agreement with 
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Dillwyn's sentiments: "For my part I confess that I cannot 
refuse to admit the truth of the first, and perhaps the most 
important of these propositions that 'the present position 
of the Irish Church Establishment is unsatisfactory. 11115 
He reiterated arguments made by the proponents of the 
measure. 
Gladstone, however, felt that he could not support 
the measure. He had divided the question into two parts: 
1) that the then current arrangements were unsatisfactory, 
and 2) that they required the immediate attention of the 
government. The first proposition he agreed with; the 
second he did not. He felt that the question was "not so 
much a question for the present as for future 
consideration. 1116 
Gladstone believed that Parliament "ought to decline 
to follow him [Dillwyn] into the lobby, and declare that it 
is the duty of the Government to give their early attention 
to the subject "17 Gladstone felt that the time was 
not ripe, for a variety of reasons, to disestablish the 
Irish church. To begin with, the "country" (and he most 
likely meant England) was not ready to address the question 
of disestablishment. Parliament, elected in 1859, had not 
been returned on the issue of disestablishment, and 
/ 
Gladstone felt that before Parliament could undertake such 
18 
an arduous task the electorate should be consulted. 
Another problem was that disestablishment and the issue of 
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the endowments were extremely complicated. The question of 
what to do with the endowments was very complex and needed a 
great deal of study. 19 Finally, Gladstone felt that the 
members of Parliament should not support Dillwyn's motion, 
••• because if we gave a vote to that effect, we 
should be committing one of the gravest offences of 
which a Government could be guilty--namely, giving a 
deliberate, a solemn, promise to the country, wh~5h 
promise it would be out of our power to fulfill. 
Gladstone admitted that the condition of the Irish 
church was unsatisfactory. He was not, however, willing to 
commit himself to taking any action against it. Gladstone 
had condemned the Church in very harsh words in both his 
conversation with Lord Enfield in 1864 and in his speech 
before Parliament in 1865. Gladstone really could not help 
being so condemnatory. As R. Shannon has pointed out, 
"Gladstone was not comfortable unless he could base his 
proposed action upon the foundation of some simple, large, 
grand first principle "21 His intentions, however, 
were moderate despite the effect his words had on those 
around him. 22 Gladstone's speeches were often as incautious 
as his actions were cautious. 
Gray's Motions, 1866 and 1867 
Gray's motion in 1866 came at a bad time. Gladstone 
and the Liberals were extremely busy with the pending 
/ 
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electoral reform legislation and probably did not have 
enough time to devote to the issue of the Irish church. The 
constraints on Gladstone's time, however, did not prevent 
him from dealing with the issue of Irish discontent. Early 
in 1866, Gladstone made a speech in favor of the suspension 
of habeas corpus in Ireland. 23 He also did some reading on 
the question of Irish discontent. 24 He did not, however, 
study the issue of the Irish church. The nature of his 
reading showed a growing awareness of the Irish inquietude. 
The Russell government (Palmerston had died in 1865) 
fell on the issue of electoral reform. The issue of reform 
did not, however, die with the Liberal government. After 
the failure of the Reform Bill, the English countryside 
erupted into a flurry of angry "monster" meetings held to 
demand electoral reform from Parliament. The Conservative 
government of Derby found itself with a potential crisis on 
its hands. The Liberals, now sitting in opposition, were 
waiting for a chance to drive the Conservatives from power. 
Many Englishmen were aroused and demanded that they be 
given the vote. If not for the actions of Disraeli, the 
Conservatives might not have lasted more than a few months. 
Disraeli realized that electoral reform was inevitable and 
he saw no reason why the Conservatives should not get the 
credit for extending the franchise. The violence in England 
had not been serious, but it was sufficient to convince the 
Conservatives that some sort of electoral reform was 
/./ 
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necessary. 
The question of reform was debated into the early part 
of 1867. Disraeli's initial bill was extremely 
conservative, and the Liberals set out to amend it into a 
bill more to their liking. Much to the Liberals' frustra-
tion, Disraeli went along with all their amendments. 
Consequently, the 1867 Reform of Parliament Act was much 
more liberal than the Liberals' first bill in 1866. Over 
the years, steady pressure on Parliament had netted the 
proponents of electoral reform a carefully considered and 
rather conservative bill. Widespread discontent after the 
failure of the bill created a bill that neither party had 
imagined possible in 1865. The Conservatives had been 
shocked into realizing that electoral reform was a necessity 
by the intensity of discontent in 1866. Would widespread 
discontent have to infect Ireland before either party would 
take up the issue of disestablishment? 
By April of 1867 most of the substantive issues 
dealing with electoral reform had been dealt with, which 
left the rest of that year to consider other questions. The 
proponents of church disestablishment used the relative lull 
in parliamentary business to bring forth yet another motion 
to address the problem of the Church of Ireland. Gladstone 
did, on this occasion, feel inclined to speak on the issue. 
He spoke in favor of Gray's motion, but was not, as he told 
the House, entirely happy in doing so. Gladstone told Gray 
/' 
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that he felt difficulty in supporting the measure, not 
because he questioned the "soundness of the main 
proposition," but because, in a refrain that was becoming 
all too familiar, he questioned "whether the time had come 
when a practical plan upon this subject can with advantage 
be submitted to Parliament. 1125 Gladstone was worried about 
the complicated nature of the issue and was not sure that it 
had been considered long enough to be effectively dealt with 
by Parliament. 
Gladstone was happy, however, that Gray's motion 
called for the formation of a committee. Gladstone had 
opposed the earlier measures because they had called for a 
consideration by the whole House to deal with the problem 
of the Church of Ireland. Gladstone had felt that the 
House as a whole could not even tentatively deal with such 
an important issue. For that reason, Gladstone had spoken 
against Dillwyn's motions (in 1863 and 1865) even though he 
had expressed sympathy with the sentiments that lay behind 
the measures. Gray's motion in 1867 called for the 
formation of a committee. Gladstone felt that the issue 
of what to do about the Irish church could be discussed 
calmly within a committee, whereas if the whole House took 
up the issue, great "mischief might be done by a premature 
attempt at legislation. 1126 He then turned his attention to 
the arguments of the Conservatives. 
/ 
/ 
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Gladstone started his attack on the Conservatives by 
claiming that the Catholics could not be held captive to the 
views of the long dead Lord Plunkett. Gladstone argued that 
the Catholics had respected the existence of the Irish 
church and had done so with "great patience." 27 He further 
added that, even if Catholics were prevented from attacking 
the Irish church because Lord Plunkett had accepted the 
Church of Ireland as a necessary part of the Union, 
Gladstone, as an Anglican, was under no restrictions in that 
sense. Gladstone added that, if the roles were reversed and 
the Catholic church was established in Protestant England 
or Scotland, Parliament and the English would be working 
with all their might to change that situationj and, 
Gladstone added, they would be right in so doing. 28 
Gladstone also attacked various other notions advanced 
during the debate in defense of the Church of Ireland. He 
was skeptical of the idea that the Irish church was 
necessary because it administered to the majority of the 
"highly educated" citizens of Ireland. Gladstone commented 
that, if those "gentlemen" were so highly skilled and 
educated, they should be able to "subsist on their own means 
and not on means supplied by the public from sources which 
are not legitimate." 29 Gladstone further felt that the 
Conservatives were wrong in their belief that the voluntary 
system would not work for the Church of Ireland in the 
countryside (the Conservatives did admit that the voluntary 
·1 
system would probably work in the towns). He pointed out 
that the voluntary system had worked quite well for the 
Roman Catholic Church, and, he added, he assumed that it 
would work just as well for the members of the Church of 
Ireland. 30 Gladstone was particularly amused by Heygate's 
argument that, if the Irish church was disestablished, the 
Protestants in Ireland would increase their proselytism 
among the Catholics. Gladstone took Heygate's argument 
and turned it against the Conservatives. He argued that 
if Heygate was correct the Conservatives had no choice but 
to vote for the measure. Gladstone followed Heygate's 
argument to its logical conclusion: if the Church 
represented truth, and if the removal of the Church of 
Ireland created a feeling of missionary fervor in the 
Protestants, the result of which was the conversion of 
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more Catholics to the Protestant faith, then the best thing 
for the Protestant religion would be the removal of the 
Church of Ireland. 31 He was most puzzled with the 
Conservatives' contention that the disestablishment of the 
Church of Ireland would be the cause of even greater civil 
strife. Gladstone found strange the threat of greater civil 
disobedience: 
That threat is very often used in these discussions, 
but what is the meaning of it? It seems to me to 
mean this. There are present a large body in 
Ireland who have not obtained equality, and, 
because they have not, there is an absence or a 
partial absence of religious peace; but there is 
another party in Ireland who have more than 
equality--who have got advantages and 
priviledges--and if they are put on an equality 
they will protest against it and make more 
disturbance beca~~e they have equal treatment with 
their neighbors. 
Gladstone doubted that such a party existed in Ireland. 
Gladstone was in agreement with Gray and the 
proponents of the motion on the issue of the establishment 
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as a source of civil discontent. Gladstone claimed that he 
was in agreement with Gray when Gray claimed that the "state 
was finding fuel for the Protestant Churches in Ireland," 
to which Gladstone added that he was afraid that the "state 
is not only finding fuel for the Establishment, but fueling 
a great many other flames. 1133 Gladstone summarized his 
feelings on the relative merits of disestablishment on the 
civil welfare of Ireland: 
If we look to Irishmen for the same allegience 
{sic], if we call upon the community of Ireland to 
support and sustain us in applying restrictive 
measures to the disaffected ••• do not deny 34hat reciprocity is the essence of justice itself. 
He fully believed that disestablishment was both a reward 
and inducement to the Irish to continue their union with 
England. 
Gladstone was not against all establishments. He 
outlined three instances in which he felt that an 
establishment was correct and desirable. The first was on 
the basis of truth: 
That is one ground on which an Established Church 
may be maintained~ but if you maintain the 
Established Church in Ireland on the ground of 
truth, you cannot at the same time maintain and 
educate a priesthood who teach the pe~gle that the 
truth is not be found in that Church. 
The second instance in which an established church merited 
support was if it ministered to a majority of the 
population. The third instance was if the church was the 
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church of "the mass of the poorer portion of the 
population." 36 Not even the Conservatives could argue that 
the bulk of the poor Irish were Protestant; the 
Conservatives had, in fact, argued that the Church of 
Ireland should be maintained because the bulk of the 
productive and wealthy members of Irish society were 
Protestants. 
Gladstone closed his statements by repeating the point 
that the time for reform would soon be at hand: 
I think the hon. Member for Longford is correct 
in his anticipation that the time is not far distant 
when the Parliament of England, which at present 
undoubtedly had its hands full of other most 
important business and engagements, would feel it 
its duty to look this question fairly and fully in 
the face; and I confess that I am sanguine enough 
to cherish a hope that, though not without 
difficulty, a satisfactory result will be arrived 
at, the consequences of which will be so happy and 
pleasant for us all that we shall wonder at the 
folly ~9ich has so long prevented it being brought 
about. 
He had come as close as he could to supporting the measure 
without taking it under his wing and adopting it as his own. 
Gladstone and many other influential Liberals, however, 
voted for the measure, which went down to defeat by a vote 
of 195 to 183. 38 
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Gladstone was moving, albeit slowly, to the conclusion 
that action would have to be taken with respect to the 
Church of Ireland. He accepted all the arguments advanced 
by the proponents of the measure. The vote had been close, 
and the only possible way the balance could be tipped 
would be if Gladstone, Russell, or some other member within 
the inner circle of the Liberal Party (such as Chicester 
Fortescue) adopted the measure for the Liberals and led the 
battle in Parliament. 
Gladstone's willingness to speak in terms of first 
principles tended to get him into trouble with his own 
party. The other leaders of the Liberal Party feared the 
effect that his words would have upon the rest of 
Parliament. Conversely, the Conservatives never trusted 
Gladstone. Some felt that Gladstone was more interested 
in his own personal power than he was in addressing the 
reform of the Irish church. Despite Gladstone's willingness 
to talk of first principles, his motives were not that much 
more different than those of his colleagues in the Liberal 
Party. 
Gladstone's speech in 1865 had caused consternation 
for both Liberals and Conservatives alike. Viscount 
Palmerston, the Prime Minister, had heard rumors that 
Gladstone intended to speak as an "individual" member. 
Palmerston attempted to stop Gladstone and sent him a 
message asking if it was possible for a member of the 
government to speak as an individual member: 
I understand that you propose to state tomorrow 
on Dillwyn's Motion about the Irish Church your 
personal views upon that Matter, as an individual 
but not as a Member of the Government--! do not 
know what your personal views on the matter are, 
but is it possible for a Member of a Government 
speaking from the Treasury Bench so to sever 
himself from the Body Corporate to which he 
belongs, as to be able to express decided opinions, 
or to abstain from acting upon those opinions when 
required to act as a Member of th3 9Government taking Part in the Decision of the Body? 
Gladstone ignored Palmerston's note and spoke anyway. 
The Conservatives were ready with their analysis of 
Gladstone's motives. Mr. Whiteside, the member for the 
University of Dublin, and later a Chief Justice, expounded 
on two possibilities for Gladstone's partial support for 
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Dillwyn's motion. His first attack on Gladstone dealt with 
Gladstone's reasons for holding back complete support from 
Dillwyn's motion. Whiteside claimed that he remembered a 
speech by Gladstone in which Gladstone had stated that the 
time for parliamentary reform was not at hand because the 
issue was not within the purview of "practical politics." 
Whiteside stated that: 
I am confirmed in the opinion by his speech 
to-night, that his object was to lay the 
foundation of another scheme, a policy of 
another and not very distant day, when he might 
be able to say the time had come, and a change 
of feeling had been provoked out of doors that 
woul~0enable him to do then what he fears to do now. 
Whiteside also suspected that Gladstone was buying 
time until he could better control the party. Whiteside 
felt that Gladstone's speech was a cowardly ruse: 
Fundamental Acts of Legislature are not to be 
got rid of in that manner anymore than the 
fundamental institutions of the Empire are to 
be placed in danger, not indeed by any present 
Act, not by any present Motion, but by laying 
the foundation and sowing the seeds of that 
future policy which will be adopted when the 
noble Viscount is no longer at the h~~d of the 
Government to restrain or direct it. 
In both cases Whiteside felt that Gladstone, in a most 
cynical fashion, was waiting for the most opportune moment 
to spring the issue of disestablishment on an unwary House 
of Commons. 
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How perceptive is Whiteside's analysis of Gladstone's 
motives? His reasoning that Gladstone was waiting for 
Palmerston's death or resignation is unsatisfactory. 
Whiteside, in all probability, knew nothing of Palmerston's 
letter to Gladstone. Consequently Whiteside did not know 
that Gladstone was more than willing to go his own way even 
when asked not to. Gladstone had, in fact, forced the issue 
of parliamentary reform on an unwilling Palmerston, 42 and, 
had he felt sufficiently motivated, probably could have 
forced Palmerston to accept reform of the Church of Ireland 
as well. 
Whiteside's argument that Gladstone did not feel the 
time was suitable to bring the issue forward took on a 
veneer of cynicism. According to Whiteside, Gladstone 
merely wanted to misdirect the attention of the House while 
he prepared the ground for an attack on the church 
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establishment in Ireland. Stripped of Whiteside's cynicism, 
however, Whiteside's statement is not too far off the mark. 
Three years later, in 1868, Gladstone claimed that the 
"question was not within the range of the practical politics 
of the day ••• " 43 
There were other reasons for Gladstone's reticence. 
In a letter to Robert Phillimore (February 1865), he noted 
that the Irish church was not being challenged: 
It exists, and is virtually almost unchallenged 
as to its existence in that capacity; it may long 
(I cannot quite say long may it) outlive me; I will 
never be a party knowingly, to what I may call 
frivolous acts of disturbances, ~~ to the premature 
production of schemes of change. 
Gladstone later admitted that, "Had any man said to me, 'How 
soon will it come on?' I should have replied, 'Heaven 
knows, perhaps it will be five years, perhaps it will be 
ten. I u45 Gladstone, in 1865, had no idea when he felt the 
issue would be ripe for action. 
Gladstone's reluctance to deal conclusively with 
disestablishment before 1868 was due to ambivalence over the 
practical political effects of the measure. Abstract 
justice was not a sufficient reason to prompt Gladstone and 
the other Liberals into action. Gladstone was loathe to 
engage in any hasty action that threatened the existence 
of the Church of Ireland and the domestic and political 
tranquility of England. 
Why did Gladstone give a speech that could be 
construed to be in favor of a revision in the status of the 
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Church of Ireland? Why did he make a favorable statement 
and then turn around and say that the time for action was 
not yet at hand? It seems likely that Gladstone was 
attempting to put the Liberal Party on notice that, at some 
point in the future, events might deem it necessary to take 
up the issue of the Irish church. In a sense Gladstone was 
attempting to help define the future course of the Liberal 
Party. In his conversation with the Duke of Enfield, 
Gladstone had told Enfield that he thought "it would not 
do to go to a dissolution without some proof that they were 
really the Liberal party. 1146 Enfield was even more 
confounded when Gladstone had expressed his personal wish 
that the "present cabinet should fall, on the ground that 
it had grown indolent and feeble, and wanted some years of 
"t" t · · l"f 1147 opposi ion o give it new i e. 
Gladstone's speech in favor of the intent of Dillwyn's 
motion had immediate consequences: he lost his seat at 
Oxford. The seat was most likely lost because, for the 
first time, ballots could be mailed, and Gladstone had 
incurred the wrath of the clerical graduates with his speech 
48 on the Church of Ireland. Gladstone, however, then stood 
for South Lancashire, and in another of his more famous 
speeches claimed that he came before them "unmuzzled." 
Once unmuzzled, however, he did not approach the question 
of the Irish church; he attacked the question of 
parliamentary reform. 
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1867-1868 
In 1868 Gladstone gave notice of his intent to bring 
before Parliament various motions that dealt with the Irish 
church. 49 Gladstone's motions in 1868 represented a 
triumph for the supporters of disestablishment. What had 
changed? In 1867 Gladstone had been willing to give support 
to a measure that would create a parliamentary committee to 
look into the problem of the Irish church, albeit 
reluctantly. 50 Gladstone's speech in 1867 had reflected his 
caution and concern that precipitate change was to be as 
feared as injustice. Yet in 1868 Gladstone was ready and 
willing to disestablish the Church of Ireland. 
In order to understand why Gladstone changed his mind, 
and why he decided to rally the Liberal Party around the 
issue of church disestablishment, we must turn our attention 
to the condition of Ireland in the 1860s. We must see how 
British perceptions of Irish discontent changed. The step 
from a committee to full-blown legislation on the Irish 
church was more significant than it first appears. The 
establishment of a committee was how the British, and 
Gladstone, preferred to address important and complicated 
issues. In the calm deliberation of the committee some sort 
of compromise could be worked out, and minimal damage done 
to the British constitution. Gladstone's call for 
legislation in 1868 was an attempt to head off a problem 
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that had, in the perception of the English, become much more 
serious. Finally, we must understand the effect the Fenians 
had upon the British imagination, and their role in 
convincing the English that something had to be done. 
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... CHAPTER IV 
THE FENIANS 
The problems that plagued the relationship between 
Ireland and England go far beyond anything the Fenians did. 
The majority of the Irish had long felt some sort of 
antipathy toward the English. The English had responded to 
expressions of Irish discontent, when it flared up, with a 
mixture of legislation, repression, and a nagging sensation 
that, underneath it all, they really did not understand 
what the Irish wanted. Reform, it seemed, always followed 
upon the heels of evident discontent--such as Catholic 
emancipation and repeal of the Corn Laws. Even O'Connell, 
who preferred constitutional action over violence, had found 
it necessary to use the threat of violence to carry his 
Irish reforms through Parliament. Ever since O'Connell's 
death in 1847, Ireland had been relatively quiet. With the 
formation of the Irish Revolutionary (or Republican) 
Brotherhood (IRB) and the Fenians in 1858/59, and the 
subsequent formation of the National Association in 1864, 
the Irish were again agitating for change in Ireland. 
The IRB was founded in Dublin on March 17, 1858, by 
James Stephens. The Fenian Brotherhood was formed in the 
United States in April of 1859 by James Mahoney. 1 The 
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English considered both groups to be one and the same, and 
at times it was hard to tell the difference between the two. 
The stated goal of the IRB was the overthrow of the English 
government in Ireland and the establishment of an Irish 
republic. The American organization was originally founded 
to provide money and other support to the Irish Fenians. 2 
The American Civil War interrupted the activities of the 
American organization and for the first few years both 
organizations were relatively quiescent. 
In 1863, the Fenians established a newspaper, The 
Irish People. 3 The paper was founded by Thomas Clarke Luby 
(proprietor), Jeremiah O'Donovan Rossa (manager and 
publisher), and John O'Mahony (editor). The paper was 
rather strident in its tone and was closed down by the 
government in 1865. The Fenians planned an uprising for 
1865 when it became apparent that the American Civil War was 
about to end. The Fenians hoped that, once Irish-American 
soldiers were freed from their duties in the United States, 
they would be able to provide experienced leadership and 
money for the rebellion. The leader of the Fenians, James 
Stephens, was arrested and the rebellion failed to 
materialize. 
The failure of revolt in 1865 caused a break in the 
Fenian movement. The Americans split from the Irish 
organization and removed James Stephens as their "head 
centre." The Irish movement itself split into two competing 
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groups, and the Fenians remained disorganized for the rest 
of the 1860s. The suspension of habeas corpus in Ireland in 
1866 drove the Fenians either underground or out of the 
country altogether. Some of those who left transferred 
their activities to England where some of the larger cities 
had significant Irish populations. Although there were some 
abortive risings in Ireland in 1866, none of them did much 
more than illustrate the efficiency of the governmental 
forces in Ireland. 
Eighteen sixty-seven, however, was to be in some ways 
a banner year for the Fenians. Although they failed in 
their attempt to gain access to the arms at Chester Castle, 
and their attempt to liberate two prisoners f~om Clerkenwell 
prison ended with the death of 12 innocent people--without 
freeing the two prisoners--the Fenian movement managed to 
capture the British imagination as it never had before. The 
execution of three Fenians convicted in a killing at 
Manchester elicited a sympathetic response in Ireland; the 
death of 12 persons in the rescue attempt at Clerkenwell 
enraged English opinion. 
The attempts by the English to suppress the Fenian 
movement did not entirely succeed. Only when the failure 
of suppression became manifest to the English did they 
seriously start to consider addressing Irish grievances. 
The Fenians had focused British attention on the plight of 
the Irish, but the three major grievances of the more vocal 
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Irish--tenant rights, disestablishment and education--were 
of little concern to the Fenians. Only when the Fenians 
threatened to acquire popular support in Ireland were the 
English willing to consider Irish grievances. 
The Catholic Church and the Fenians 
Officially the Catholic church condemned the Fenians. 
Archbishop Paul Cullen4 attacked the Fenians in an 1865 
pastoral: 
As to what is called Fenianism, you are aware that 
looking on it a compound of folly and wickedness 
wearing the mask of patriotism to make dupes of the 
unwary, and as the work of a few fanatics or knaves, 
wicked enough to jeopardise others in order to 
promote their own sordid views, I have repeatedly 
raised my voice against it since it first became 
known at the time of M'Manus's [sic] funeral four 
years ago and that I cautioned young men against 
promising or swearing obedience to strangers with 
whom they were altogether unacquainted, putting 
themselves at the mercy of plotting spies and 
treacherous informers and risking their lives and 
liberty and endangering the lives of others in 
attempting to carry out projects, hopeless in 
themselves, which doing no good to any class, might 
involve the country in ruin and bloodshed. Would 
to God that more attention had been paid to such 
friendly admonitions. If they had been listened to 
we would not now have to regret that so many young 
men are suffering the hardships of prison and their 
families overwhelmed with affliction, whilst their 
seducers are far away from danger, laughing at the 
simplicity 05 their dupes and enjoying the wages 
of iniquity. 
Cullen found fault with the Fenians on several points. 6 
For one, they were revolutionary in their ideas. Cullen 
claimed that the Fenians "preach up socialism, to seize 
on the property of those who have any." 7 Cullen considered 
the Fenians as the natural result of the movements in 
liberalism and rationalism. 8 
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Many of the parish priests, however, were caught in a 
real dilemma. The problem was, as Bishop Keane pointed out, 
that the priests were losing ground with their parishioners: 
The great question of the day is that of 
'Fenianism.' It is destined to exercise an 
extraordinary influence on the future relations 
between priests and people • • • For some years 
past, several complaints were made by the people 
against what they called the inactivity and neglect 
of the priests. In plain words, it was said over 
and over again, 'that the priests don't care about 
us any longer. They and the upper class Catholics 
who expect places are well enough off, and they no 
longer feel for the suffering of farmers and 
working people.' This language and sentiment 
have prepared many to adopt • • • conspiraEy 
against a government that refused redress. 
Keane further added, "if once the masses throw off the 
respect they have always felt for their priests, then will 
come the real Irish difficulty for England and for all 
concerned." 9 There was a fear among the bishops and 
archbishops that the Irish were turning away from their 
priests, and turning to other organizations that promised, 
if not a solution to their outstanding grievances with 
England, at least a +ight against English presence in 
Ireland. In fact, priests who were either too condemnatory 
toward the Fenians, or who had been educated at Maynooth, 
the state-controlled school, were sometimes ignored and 
shunned: 
When the priests condemned Fenianism in the 
confessional and refused the Sacraments to persons 
connected with it, many Fenian youths of Cork gave 
up going to Confession to priests who had been 
educated at Maynooth, but some of them confessed 
to priests brought up in foreign seminaries • • • 
Maynooth priests, being educated at the expense 
of the State, are suspect0d of being more or less 
in the English interest. 
Nor were all the clergy necessarily against the 
Fenians. Father Lavelle, a Catholic priest, was noted for 
preaching that Catholics had a right to revolution. 11 
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Father Lavelle's actions were essentially ignored by Bishop 
McHale, who refused to take any concrete action against the 
errant priest. Cullen vented his frustrations against 
McHale to Archbishop Keely: 
I hope Dr. McHale will after the last letter take 
some steps against Lavelle. It is too bad to 
oblige the Holy See to occupy itself so often 
with that unhappy priest. One word from Dr. McHale 
two years ago ordering Lavelle to stay in his 
parish, and not act as vice-president of the 
St. Patrick's Brotherhood, would have savI~ 
himself and that priest from great evils. 
Cullen, McHale and Lavelle all represented the three basic 
stances that the Irish Catholic clergy could take toward 
the Fenians: hostility, indifference, and support. 
The Catholic hierarchy was technically against all 
secret societies that in some way advocated abandonment 
of the traditional political and social values in favor of 
the more neutral liberal state. In this sense, the 
Catholic church feared the Fenians and their call for a 
secular Irish republic. The problem was that as long as 
the Irish remained discontented and the English dragged 
their feet on reform, the Church would continue to lose 
support in favor of those persons who promised an end to 
Irish suffering. The priests who worked at an intimate 
level with the Irish people felt acutely the pull of the 
dual loyalties of the Church and of their flocks. The 
longer the English delayed reform, the more willing the 
priests became to support those with extreme solutions to 
Irish discontent. 
The English and the Irish Catholic Church 
The English, for their part, quite often viewed the 
Irish priests as being meddlesome, especially when it came 
to politics. Cardinal Cullen, who roundly condemned the 
Fenians, was seen by some Englishmen as being quarrelsome: 
I wish, tho' of course in vain, that some check 
could be put upon Cullen. I told the Pope that 
he was the bitter and pertinacious enemy of the 
English government and he never misses an 
opportunity of doing mischief ••• It is really 
too bad that this viper Cullen should be permitted 
to create difficulties in addition to those which 
already exist ••• I shall be glad if in gentle 
language you could convey to the Cardinal 
(Antonelli) and Manning the utter disgust 
[emphasf~ his] we feel at the conduct of Cullen 
and Co. 
The English found it necessary to work with the· 
Catholics in Ireland. One of the easiest ways for the 
English to do that was to attempt to get the Vatican to 
apply pressure on the Irish Catholics. Lord Stanley wrote 
in his journal in 1852 that his father wishes "to lay 
before the Court of Rome the conduct of the Irish 
priesthood: and to obtain a condemnation of their 
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proceedings from the highest spiritual authority. 1114 The 
English government used the same method in the 1860s to try 
to keep Catholic priests from supporting the Fenians. In a 
series of conversations with Cardinal Antonelli, Odo Russell 
(the British representative in Rome) expressed his regret 
that the "Roman Catholic Clergy in Ireland had not during 
the last 20 years opposed secret societies and revolutionary 
organizations of part of their flock, which culminated in 
F . . ,.15 en1an1sm. A month later Russell returned to tell 
Antonelli that he had "received reliable information 
according to which the priests in many places in Ireland 
had joined the Fenian movement." 16 Antonelli, much to his 
own regret, was forced several days later to ask Odo Russell 
to see him: 
His holiness had confirmed my [Russell's] 
statements by private letters which had just 
reached him from Ireland. The evil, however, was 
happily limited to one or two cases only of 
disobedience and the Pope had already caused the 
erring pries17 to be reminded of their 
duties • • • 
The English did not entirely trust the Catholic 
priests; yet they were forced to work through them to try 
and stem the tide of Fenianism. Despite being, officially 
at least, on the same side of the question with reference to 
the Fenians, each mistrusted the other. The Vatican 
considered "fenianism [sic] a punishment from heaven for the 
revolutionary policy of Great Britain on the Continent. 1118 
As long as Irish discontent remained unaddressed, the 
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Catholic Church in Ireland remained a tenuous ally at best. 
The English and the Fenians 
Although the Fenians had been formed in 1858, their 
first real noticeable appearance in Ireland was at the 1861 
funeral of the Young Irelander, Terence Bellow MacManus. 
MacManus, who had died in the United States, was exhumed and 
brought back to Ireland for burial in December, 1861. 
Although the Fenians played a relatively minor role in the 
funeral itself, it was at this time that they finally came 
to the notice of the Irish by their boisterour dernonstra-
tions claiming MacManus as one of their own. 19 However, the 
Fenians did not come to the notice of the English government 
until the next year (1862). Sir George Grey, the Horne 
Secretary, admitted on the floor of the Commons that they 
(the government) had not known of the existence of the 
Fenians until 1862, at which time they were "few and 
inconsiderable. 1120 The Fenians did not remain insignificant 
for long. 
By 1863 the Fenians showed signs of increased activity. 
It was in that year they founded their newspaper, The Irish 
People. The paper proved to be of immense significance 
because it was "largely responsible for transforming 
Stephens' movement into a major phenomenon in Irish public 
life in the mid 1860's." 21 Publication of the newspaper 
helped to spread the Fenian movement throughout Ireland. 22 
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In 1863 the English also became aware of the potential 
threat of Fenianism in the United States. In October of 
1863 the New York Mercury published an article--reprinted by 
newspapers in Ireland and Britain--that created the 
impression of a "very powerful Irish-American enterprise 
geared to winning Irish independence and ready to roll." 23 
In November 1863, the Fenians held their first convention in 
Chicago, which again was widely publicized in the papers in 
Ireland and Britain. By early 1864, the authorities in 
Ireland were on the lookout for Fenians. 24 
The threatened invasion of Ireland by American Fenians 
did not materialize in 1864. The Americans were involved in 
the Civil War, and a great number of American Fenians were 
involved in the fighting on both sides. The Fenians in 
Ireland, while waiting for the help promised them from 
America, kept busy promoting their cause. Both Stephens 
and O'Donovan Rossa toured Ireland and Great Britain 
drumming up support for their organization. 
Eighteen sixty-four also saw the emergence of two 
organizations that competed with the Fenians for dominance 
over the future direction of Irish politics: the Irish 
National League and the National Association. The National 
League was founded on January 21, 1864. The goal of the 
League was "the restoration of a separate and independent 
legislature," and included in its membership The O'Donoghue, 
the M.P. for Tipperary (and later in 1865 the M.P. for 
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Tralee), and A. M. Sullivan, the editor of the Nation. 25 
The National Association was formed in late 1864 to provide 
a "constitutional" organization that was to present to 
Parliament solutions to the three most pressing Irish 
grievances: church disestablishment, land tenure, and 
education (in the form of state-supported denominational 
schools). As E. R. Norman has stated, "the National 
Association of Ireland was one of the more happy results 
of Fenian organization, for it was established to provide 
an alternative, safe and constitutional means of securing 
the redress of Irish grievances." 26 The Fenians, the 
National League and the National Association all competed 
with each other for leadership in Irish politics. The 
struggle for dominance in 1864 was largely won by the 
Fenians: 
Throughout most of 1864 and all of 1865, normal 
political activity (in Ireland) was paralysed 
by Fenianism as by a spectre. The belief that 
they had in their midst a secret revolutionary 
army of unknown strength (with powerful allies 
across the Atlantic) about to throw the country 
into indescribable turmoil left most of the 
inhabitan27 of Ireland without any stomach for 
politics. 
The Fenians, the United States and the English, 1865-66 
All along the English government had worried about the 
close connection between the United States and the Fenians. 
The Government's suspension of the Habeas Corpus Act in 1866 
was in large part motivated by their fear of the Americans. 28 
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The government was afraid that once the Union Army in the 
United States was disbanded, large numbers of Irish-American 
Fenians would return to Ireland to fight against British 
rule. In April of 1865 Mr. Whiteside asked, on the floor of 
the House, the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 
Mr. Laylard, 
whether the Foreign Office has received despatches 
or any information relative to statements lately 
published in this country to the effect that 
encouragement has been given by eminent political 
individuals in the United States to a confederacy 
of Fenians designed to attack Canada, to invade 
Ireland, 2~nd to make war, when required, upon England? 
Mr. Whiteside, in particular was referring to an earlier 
article from the Times which he read aloud to Parliament. 
The article claimed that, 
On the 6th of March, 1864, a report of a meeting 
of the Executive Committee of the Fenians at Chicago 
appeared in the Sunday Mercury, which circulates 
largely among the Irish in this city, which stated 
that 'the Committee had received letters of 
encouragement from hundreds of prominent men in 
the country, including the Postmaster General, 
Mr. Montgomery Blair, Secretary Seward, Governor 
Yates (of Illinois), Mr. Speaker Colfax (of the 
House of Representatives), Colonel Mulligan, and 
hundreds of off ~ 0ers in the army and navy of the United States.' 
In addition he noted that the Times had reported that the 
Fenians had held a convention on December 26, 1864, in 
which the Fenians claimed that "it was the duty of the 
American Government to declare immediate war against 
England. 1131 
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Mr. Laylard responded that he had been in 
correspondence with the government of the United States and 
that there were "only two facts mentioned which required 
official notice on the part of Her Majesty's Government." 
First, that Colonel J. H. Gleason had been given leave from 
the Army of the Potomac for the purpose of attending a 
meeting (that was unspecified), and, second, that the 
Attorney General of Louisiana had been present at a meeting 
of Fenians. The American government had responded that 
Colonel Gleason had been due a leave, and that there was no 
law against his attending a meeting of the Fenians. 
Mr. Laylard further reported that "Mr. Steward stated 
that the Attorney General of Louisiana was not responsible 
for his acts to the Government of the United States, but 
only to the particular State of which he was Attorney 
General. 1132 
The suspension of habeas corpus in 1866 created a 
whole new set of problems for the governments of Great 
Britain and the United States. Even before the suspension 
of habeas corpus, there was the potential for trouble 
because Irish-Americans were being arrested by the Irish 
authorities. On November 11, 1865, Captain Fanning, who 
had been an officer in the Tenth Ohio Volunteer Infantry, 
wrote a letter to Secretary of State Seward complaining 
that he had been unjustly arrested. His letter serves as 
a model for much of the correspondence on the issue of 
Americans arrested in Ireland. After being released from 
his duties in the American army, he travelled to visit 
friends in Ireland. He reached Dublin on the 16th of 
September. On the 2nd of October he left Dublin to visit 
relatives at Ballinamore, in County Leitrim: 
I reached the town of Killeshundra on the third 
of October and while waiting to change horses, was 
arrested by Sub-Inspector Valentine of the 
constabular or rural police, my baggage searched, 
my pistol, one round of ammunition for the same, 
with a few caps, taken from me, and myself and 
Lieutenant McNeff, of the same regiment, 
handcuffed and thrown into jail at Cavan, 
regardless of our solemn protest against such 
an offense being offered to an American citizen 
journeying through this place. I was incarcerated 
for seventeen days without trial at the instance 
of the police • • • 
When I threw off my allegiance to Victoria, the 
Queen of England, and put myself under the aegis 
of the United States, I felt such a thrill of 
exultation on changing the degrading status of 
a mere subject to the proud one of citizenship, 
as c~~ld not have been known to even the Roman of 
old. 
The case of Captain Fanning illustrates the problems 
faced by Great Britain in attempting to stifle the Fenian 
movement. The English found it necessary to be extremely 
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wary of strangers roaming the Irish countryside. That many 
of those strangers were Americans caused additional problems. 
The arrests of Irish-Americans raised the question as to 
which country had jurisdiction over the detained persons. 
The English did not recognize naturalized citizens, and 
felt that Irish-Americans were still British subjects. 
The government of the United States, on the other hand, 
did consider them American citizens. The suspension of 
the Habeas Corpus Act created a flood of complaints on the 
part of arrested Irish-Americans. The American consul in 
Ireland, Mr. West, was kept busy sorting out the claims 
of those who asked for the protection of the American 
34 government. 
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The Fenians in America had realized that the only way 
a successful rebellion could occur in Ireland was if Great 
Britain was involved in a war. Fenian activities in the 
United States complicated an already serious situation. 
Relations between the United States and Great Britain had 
been exacerbated because of the Alabama claims. The 
suspension of habeas corpus and the internment of 
Irish-Americans threatened to raise larger issues of 
naturalization and citizenship. Both countries behaved 
decently and the problem, as far as the British were 
concerned, had been resolved. They were able, albeit 
temporarily, to stem the tide of Fenianism in Ireland. The 
United States was happy because, within a few months after 
the suspension of habeas corpus, all Americans had been 
released. 
Suspension of Habeas Corpus 
The end of the Civil War in the United States brought 
an increasing number of Irish-Americans to Ireland and, 
according to Sir George Grey, the danger of Fenianism had 
increased alarmingly in consequence. 35 Through 1865 the 
Liberal government of Palmerston insisted on dealing with 
the Fenians by the usual legal means available. On 
September 19, 1865, Government forces in Ireland seized 
both the leaders of the movement and closed down their 
newspaper, The Irish People. 36 
The use of normal legal channels was not enough and, 
on February 17, 1866, Sir George informed Parliament that 
it was his sad duty to introduce a bill that would suspend 
the Habeas Corpus Act in Ireland. Sir George claimed that 
in "making the motion" he was doing so with a "deep sense" 
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that it was the government's duty to ask Parliament for the 
"additional power" to: 
put an effectual check on a wicked and widespread 
conspiracy which now exists in Ireland, and to 
afford protection to the loyal and fait~7u1 
subjects of Her Majesty in the country. 
Sir George went on to state that the "Fenian conspiracy has 
lately assumed proportions, a form, and an organization 
which could hardly have been expected a short time ago." 38 
Charles Adams, the American ambassador to Great Britain, 
reported to William Seward, Secretary of State, that he had 
learned: 
from several sources that the uneasiness and 
discontent in Ireland are not thought to have 
been diminished by the conviction and sentence 
of the offenders who have been brought to trial. 
The Fenian organization (in Ireland) is affirmed 
to be spreading in every direction, carrying with 
it many of the more intelligent class of the 
tenantry, and even comp391ing the acquiescence 
of some of the priests. 
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The suspension of the Act of Habeas Corpus in Ireland 
was necessary, or so the British government thought, for a 
variety of reasons. The English felt that Ireland was 
rapidly becoming ungovernable. Lord Wodehouse, the Lord 
Lieutenant for Ireland, wrote to Grey, telling him that 
"I have little hope of pacifying in the alarm, which is 
doing most serious injury to every interest here, without 
seizing the agents who are busily employed all over the 
country, sowing sedition and organizing the conspiracy." 40 
Grey felt that the Fenians themselves were contemptible, 
but that they had the potential of gaining influence over 
the people of Ireland. 41 In addition, the probable longterm 
effects of Fenian influence were thought to b~ equally 
disastrous. He felt that the outcome of an insurrection, 
and he had no doubt that the English would win, would be 
"bloodshed, massacre, and the other crimes which the people 
usually commit in the first moment of an insurrection." 42 
Finally, if the Fenians were not stopped, industry in 
Ireland would be paralyzed, capital would no longer flow 
into the country, and development of Ireland's resources 
43 would be checked. 
The proposed bill was to be in effect for six months 
and was to expire on the first of September. It would give 
Dublin Castle the right to "detain such persons as he [the 
Lord Lieutenant] ••• shall suspect of conspiracy against 
Her Majesty's Person and Government." 44 The bill passed all 
three readings in both houses on the 17th. Charles Adams 
made note on Parliament's hast in his dispatch to Seward: 
Sir: The event of the week has been the 
application of ministers to Parliament for a 
suspension of the habeas corpus in Ireland. 
The reason given for this strong measure is 
the spread of the Fenian organization, in spite 
of all the efforts made to check it by ordinary 
means. The explanations were made simultaneously 
in both houses on Saturday, an unusual day for 
transactions of other than mere formal business, 
and necessary measures were passed with a rapidity 
believ~g to be unexampled even in the worst preceding 
cases. 
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Adams in fact suspected that the authorities in Ireland had 
started rounding up suspects even before the bill had been 
officially passed into law: "There is reason to believe 
that the necessary sanction was scarcely passed through its 
forms, before hundreds of suspected men were swept into 
prison "46 Indeed, the authorities in Ireland had 
jumped the gun, and "hours before they could have received 
confirmation of a formal enactment they had moved against 
47 scores of suspects." 
The Fenian threat had provoked the English to act. 
At first the English had been content to allow the law to 
take its normal course. The rapid spread of Fenianism, 
despite the arrests of its leaders, forced the English to 
suspend the Act of Habeas Corpus. It is ironic that reform 
of Irish grievances met so much resistance in Parliament, 
while on the other hand the English were capable of moving 
so quickly when they needed to strengthen the forces for 
repression. 
1867 - Chester Castle, Manchester, and Clerkenwell 
The effect of the suspension of the Act of Habeas 
Corpus worked, in some ways, as well as the English could 
have hoped. Irishmen who had been associated with the 
Fenian movement in Ireland, if they were not already in 
jail, had either fled the country, gone underground, or 
completely quit the movement. As one historian noted, 
"the suspension of habeas corpus wreaked havoc on 
Fenianism in Ireland, shifting the odds in favor of the 
authorities. 048 The suspension of habeas corpus was not 
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lifted after six months, and in four more acts the suspension 
t . d 49 was con 1nue • The initial success of the authorities in 
Ireland calmed the English people, and the Illustrated 
London News could write in January of 1867, in a tone of 
restrained optimism: 
The general gloom which enveloped 1866 was not 
relieved by the error of our domestic politics • 
To the disquiet which this question excited 
(parliamentary reform) must be added the 
apprehensions awakened by the Fenian conspiracy. 
In the earlier part of the year raids into Canada, 
in the later threatened insurrection in Ireland, 
exhibited at once the astounding folly, the 
malignity, and the pertinacity of the discordant 
materials of which that combination consists. Its 
bark, however, was worse than its bite. In America, 
the enthusiastic gallantry of the volunteers, 
backed by the loyalty of the United States 
President, quickly scattered the buccaneering 
expedition; in Ireland, the suspension of the 
Habeas Corpus Act, the judicious firmness of the 
Administration, and the skillful distribution of 
the military prevented the plot from maturing into 
rebellion; but, both in the colony and at home, 
it was a gratuitous 3Bd vexatious cause of public 
anxiety and expense. 
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The optimism of the Illustrated London News was to be 
short-lived. The Fenians in Ireland had been suppressed, 
but there were Fenians in England who were willing to take 
up the cause. 
In February of 1867, the Fenians planned a raid to 
capture the large depot of arms at Chester. Once the arms 
were seized, they were to be shipped over to Ireland. In 
anticipation of the raid, the Fenians began to congregate 
in large numbers in the town. Through the efforts of an 
informant by the name of John Joseph Corydon, the 
authorities were aware of the plans of the Fenians, and 
the police armed themselves and strengthened their numbers 
with volunteers and reinforcements. 51 The sh6w of force 
intimidated the Fenians, who dispersed into the English 
countryside. The event, as one historian has noted, "was 
in a sense a non-event in that it ended in anti-climax 
and undramatic failure." 52 
Of much greater significance than the attempted raid 
at Chester Castle was the rescue of two Fenian prisoners 
at Manchester. The Fenians planned to rescue two of their 
brethren: Colonel Thomas J. Kelly and Captain Timothy 
Deasy. In the rescue attempt on September 18th, a 
policeman, Sergeant Charles Brett, was accidentally killed. 
Five men were arrested for the shooting of Brett. Of the 
five, three were condemned to death and were executed on 
November 23rd. The three executed men, William Philip 
Allen, Michael Larkin and Michael O'Brien, joined the 
pantheon of Irish martyrs. 
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The imprisonment and the execution of the "Manchester 
Martyrs" stirred up a storm of controversy. It was not as 
if the Government (at this time under the Conservatives) 
did not know what effect political executions would have 
upon the Irish. Lord Stanley had argued against the 
execution of a Fenian prisoner back in May of 1867 because 
the execution would only turn the prisoner into a martyr 
and help the Fenian cause. 53 From the very beginning, 
however, Gathorne Hardy, the Home Secretary, was determined 
to punish those responsible for the killing at Manchester. 
On September 20th Hardy noted that the newspapers "have a 
short account of the Manchester outrage & the Times is as 
the public will be ready for strong measures. 1154 Hardy 
further felt that not to punish the Fenians would be wrong 
since England would "never endure that such an event should 
happen unpunished • II 55 If Hardy had ever been uncertain 
of what course to take, his interview with Queen Victoria 
confirmed him in his desire to see the Fenians executed: 
"Since lunch I have had a long interview with the Queen who 
was very gracious & cheerful. She spoke of Fenians--(did 
not approve of more mercy) II 5 6 
A storm of protest swept over both England and 
Ireland. In England John Bright led a delegation to the 
Home Office to convince Hardy that execution was too severe. 
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Rebuffed in his efforts, Bright wrote in his diary two days 
before the execution that the "Tories know little mercy; 
terror is their only specific. 1157 On the day after the 
execution, Bright noted that "the hanging of the 3 men at 
Manchester has caused some excitement. 1158 
In Ireland demonstrations and marches were held in 
favor of the executed Fenians. On December 1st a "large 
procession" of 2,500-3,500 people was held in Manchester: 
"as the procession marched past the New Bailey, where the 
gallows had been erected, they gave three cheers for Allen, 
Larkin and Gould. 1159 In Cork, on the 1st also, a procession 
was held that was estimated to have attracted 12,000-15,000 
marchers. 60 The largest procession was held in Dublin on 
Sunday the 8th. The Annual Register estimated that there 
were less than 16,000 marchers, although it seems likely 
that there were anywhere from 20,000 to 30,000 marchers. 61 
More important than the demonstrations themselves were some 
of the people who expressed a degree of sympathy for the 
Fenians. O'Neill Daunt, certainly no friend of the Fenians, 
called the executions "judicial murder" and claimed that 
"the murder of those three men will widen the breach between 
this country and England. 1162 Cullen allowed priests to pray 
for the Manchester men, and even allowed them to say private 
masses for them. 63 Characteristically, he couldn't help 
but take a dig at the English and wrote in a letter that 
"the English have given large sums to Garibaldi to assail 
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the Pope ••• now as they have done to others so it is done 
to themselves. 1164 Even more ominously, at the head of the 
procession in Killarney was the M.P. for Tralee, The 
O'Donoghue. 
A third event, one that shocked the English public, 
occurred at Clerkenwell prison on Friday the 13th, 1867. 
Ricard O'Sullivan Burke had been arrested by the English for 
his part in the Manchester rescue. The Fenians decided that 
they would attempt to rescue Burke and another Fenian by the 
name of Casey. 65 The plan was relatively simple. The 
rescuers were to roll a keg of gunpowder up against the 
prison wall (Burke and Casey would be doing their regular 
hour of exercise in the prison yard). A white ball was to 
be tossed over the wall to warn the two prisoners that 
their rescuers were setting off the charge. Casey and 
Burke would then wait away from the area where the hole was 
going to be blown and, in the confusion caused by the 
explosion, they would rush through the breach in the wall 
to their freedom. The first attempt on December 12th was 
unsuccessful: the fuse refused to stay lit. On the 13th 
the Fenians tried again. This time the fuse lit and blew 
a hole in the wall "twenty feet wide at the base and sixty 
feet wide at the top, killing 12 persons in the surrounding 
neighborhood and wounding close to a hundred. 1166 Burke 
and Casey, in their cells at the time of the blast, were not 
freed. 
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The effect of the Clerkenwell explosion on the English 
was profound. The English throughout the countryside became 
paranoid and started to imagine that they, too, were to be 
the victims of Fenian terrorism. Rumors of Fenian activity 
abounded throughout England. Lord Stanley noted in his 
journal that Hardy had, 
received a multitude of Fenian communications. 
One informant speaks of 155 Fenian and republican 
clubs in London alone, all unknown to the police. 
Several announce projects for blowing up the House 
of Parlt [sic], and assassinating the Queen. 
Another reported plan is to seize the P. of w. 
[sic] [Prince of Wales] on his way to or from 
Sandingham [sic]. From Philadelphia comes a story 
of an association whose object is to hire houses in 
various parts of London, fill them with combustibles, 
and set them on fire at the same time. A Fenian 
has been heard to threaten the burning of the 
theatres when full, and the destruction of public 
buildings. The police report on Fenian evidence, 
that three men are told off to assassinate Ld. 
D(erby) [sic], Hardy and me. Monck telegraphs 
(and this is the most serious, as being in some 
degree authenticated) that a ship is to sail for 
Dieppe ostensibly, really for the Bristol channel, 
from New York, with a p~7ty on board whose object 
is to murder the Queen. 
Throughout early 1868 papers such as the Illustrated London 
News constantly ran articles on the visit of the Prince of 
Wales to St. Bartholomew Hospital where many of the victims 
were staying, or they ran articles describing the recovery 
of the victims. 68 In addition, the Illustrated London News 
ran articles on the activities, or supposed activities, of 
the Fenians and of the fearful responses of various 
communities. They reported, for instance, the theft of 60 
revolvers and 1,500 rounds of ammunition in Cork. They 
reported that special constables were sworn in at the 
Woolwich arsena1. 69 The Illustrated London News was able 
to report that the "special Constable movement seems to 
have pervaded the whole of the United Kingdom. The 
provincial papers, both English and Scottish, are filled 
with reports of magisterial meetings to enroll defenders 
70 of law and order." 
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The most common reaction to the Clerkenwell explosion 
was horror and disgust. The incident at Clerkenwell divided 
American Fenians. Some of them condemned the senselessness 
of the violence. 71 More importantly, the Clerkenwell 
explosion helped those who were chronically anti-Irish. 
William Murphy was typical of the hysterical anti-Irish, 
anti-Catholic sentiment that fed off of such events. 
Throughout the 1860s he lectured for a group called the 
Protestant Evangelical Mission and Electoral Union. 72 
Murphy's speeches were vitriolic and quite often accompanied 
by violence. In one town, Wolverhampton, the violence 
was so intense that the mayor asked Murphy not to hold any 
more meetings. When Murphy refused, the mayor was forced 
to swear in special constables. 73 The combination of the 
incident at Clerkenwell and the 1868 elections provided 
Murphy with a volatile situation that he used to attack 
those who advocated Irish reform. The "no-popery" cry that 
was raised, though much more limited than the defenders 
of the established Irish church hoped, was in part due to 
the combination of discontent in Ireland, the incident at 
74 Clerkenwell, and the speeches of Murphy. Murphy called 
the demands of the Catholics "impudent" and claimed that 
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they "were reaping the fruits of the Catholic Emancipation 
Act." 75 
The events at Manchester and Clerkenwell captured the 
attention of the English as no other Fenian activities had 
before. Manchester aroused Irish sympathy for the Fenians; 
Clerkenwell horrified the English. The situation was 
becoming completely unmanageable. 
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CHAPTER V 
GLADSTONE, THE FENIANS AND CHURCH DISESTABLISHMENT 
By late 1867 it became apparent to Gladstone that 
Ireland was significantly discontented, discontented enough 
for him to go beyond personal expressions of support to 
promote disestablishment. After the events at Manchester 
and Clerkenwell, reform of the three major Irish grievances 
(land, church, and education) became necessary. Gathorne 
Hardy, the Conservative Home Secretary in 1868, noted that 
the Government "was ready to consider disestablishment, but 
proposed the postponement of the question until the next 
parliament." 1 Gladstone himself admitted in a letter to 
Earl Grey that recent problems in Ireland had convinced even 
the Conservatives of the necessity of reform: 
I further admit that Ld-Derby's Government must 
in substance have shared this impression, when 
before ~ ~ ~ party had proposed anything 
[emphasis mine], they thought it their duty to 
propound a policy for Ireland, including ~n it the 
questions of Church, Land, and Education. 
Once the Derby/Disraeli government fell in 1868, 
however, the Conservatives refused to countenance any 
change in the religious status quo in Ireland. The 
Conservatives were convinced that the Liberals had been 
influenced by the Fenians. The Conservatives were skeptical 
about the effects Irish reform would have on Fenianism. 
The Quarterly Review, a conservative magazine, felt that: 
When the suspension of the Habeas Corpus Act in 
Ireland was moved, Mr. Bright considered it a fitting 
opportunity to enlarge on the wrongs of Ireland, 
to suggest that the remedy for Fenianism was to 
be found in the alterations of the tenure of land, 
and in the abolition of the Irish Church . • • 
Whatever may be the merits of Land Reform or Church 
destruction, they have nothing to do with Fenianism. 
It will run its course whether land be placed in 
new hands or left in old ones, whether cardinal or 
archbishop rule in Dublin. It is a National, not 
a religious nor an agrarian movement, its hatred 
is not so much ~f English institutions as of 
England itself. 
The Quarterly Review was half right. There was little 
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direct link between the Fenians and church disestablishment 
in that it was not one of their demands. Furthermore, the 
Fenians were motivated by a blind and passionate hatred of 
England. While the Quarterly Review could not find any 
connection between Fenianism and church disestablishment, 
Gladstone and the Liberals could. 
Gladstone's speech in 1865 was made at a time when 
the Fenians were just beginning to make their presence 
felt. 4 The Fenians in Ireland were one of several groups 
at that time that were purporting to speak for Ireland. By 
early 1865 they had successfully made their presence felt, 
and were beginning to gain adherents among the Irish in 
Ireland and Great Britain. The American Fenians had also, 
by early 1865, gained the attention of the English. The 
English realized that, once the American Civil War was over, 
the American Fenians would attempt to act on their plans to 
free Ireland from Great Britain. Fenians were not, in 1865, 
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a direct threat, and while Gladstone was willing to admit to 
the justice of church disestablishment, he was skeptical of 
the seriousness of Irish discontent. 5 
In 1866, Gladstone, for various reasons already 
discussed, declined to address Gray's first anti-church 
t
. 6 mo ion. The Fenians in 1866, however, had become a greater 
threat than they had been in 1865. The spread of the Fenian 
movement startled many in Parliament. The Queen, in her 
opening address to Parliament, noted that a "conspiracy" 
had "appeared in Ireland" that was "adverse alike to 
Authority, Property, and Religion ••• " 7 "Fortunately," 
she continued, the Fenians were "disapproved and condemned 
alike ••• without Distinction of Creed or Class ••• ," 
and that "the Constitutional Power of the ordinary Tribunals 
had been exerted for its Repression, and the authority of 
the Law had been firmly and impartially vindicated." 8 
Eleven days later the Liberal government was sufficiently 
worried to pass the first of four habeas corpus suspension 
acts. 
Gladstone spoke in favor of suspension of the Habeas 
Corpus Act. He believed, as did many Englishmen, that the 
Fenian movement was essentially American in origin. He 
noted that they were not "wanting in funds for its support," 
and that the suspension of habeas corpus was necessary 
since under the regular laws, and with all their money, the 
Fenians were able to quickly bail themselves out of jail. 9 
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In a later debate he stated, "it may be perfectly true--and 
is, unhappily, too true--that Fenianism in the main, under 
the means by which it is supported, is a thing imported by 
America."lO Gladstone also noted that the measure had not 
been intended at the beginning of the parliamentary session 
because "the emergency was not at that time of that grave 
character which alone would have justified us in taking an 
extreme step in regard to it ••• " 11 Gladstone also 
refused to take seriously Bright's statement that, if 
Ireland could, she would "unmoor" herself and "move at 
least 2,000 miles to the west." 12 Gladstone claimed that 
the Irish could not be too unhappy with the suspension of 
habeas corpus since none of them had declared themselves 
against it. 13 Gladstone continued: 
We have the unanimous consent of the House 
expressed to this effect, and expressed by every 
member who comes from Ireland that this conspiracy 
deserves the disapproval and condemnation which 
have already been bestowed upon it by everyone who 
can claim to represent either the property14the morality, or the religion of the country." 
Gladstone still believed that Irish grievances should 
be attended to--in due time. Gladstone asked Parliament 
to "give anxious consideration • • • to every subject 
connected with the welfare of Ireland." "But," as Gladstone 
added, "do not let these subjects which, important as they 
are, are less important than the duty of today, 
interfere with the discharge of that duty." 15 
to 
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In August of 1866 he rose to speak on a renewal of the 
suspension of habeas corpus. 16 Gladstone agreed with the 
Government that an extension was necessary. He acknowledged 
that the state of affairs was not yet settled enough to 
warrant the removal of the suspension. Furthermore, 
Parliament was about to recess for six months, and in that 
time it would be impossible to re-assemble Parliament to 
pass another suspension if one were needed. 17 
Gladstone also acknowledged that there was some 
justification in Irish discontent. He stated that the 
Government, by renewing the suspension of habeas corpus, 
"enhance and deepen their own obligation to recognize and 
appreciate the true condition of Ireland." 18 Whatever 
grievances there were they could not be tied to the conduct 
of the Fenians. He noted that there were "those who look 
back to the history of Ireland [who] will feel that there 
are extenuating circumstances for political crimes in 
connection with the state of things that have existed for 
a long period." 19 Those extenuating circumstances, however, 
did not apply to the Fenians. To Gladstone, if there was 
a series of acts that exhibited the "virulence and malignity 
of Fenianism" it was the attack on Canada. 2° Canada, which 
had not done anything to the Irish or the Fenians, had been 
the victim of a "ruthless, and murderous act "21 
Gladstone was convinced that Fenianism was a cancer--
a foreign cancer. He felt that in order to cure the 
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patient, Ireland, it was necessary to first surgically 
remove the tumor. Then the patient could be helped by way 
of rehabilitation. By the end of 1866 Gladstone was 
beginning to realize that the government would have to 
consider addressing Irish grievances sometime soon. He was 
not, however, ready to commit either himself or the Liberal 
22 Party to a program of reform. 
By early 1867 Gladstone was willing to consider some 
reform of Irish grievances. The Fenians had not disappeared. 
In fact, they had attempted several abortive risings in 
Kerry and around Dublin and Munster (February 12 to March 6, 
1867). The Fenians had also attempted the raid on Chester 
Castle on the 14th of February. The Fenians in every 
instance had proven themselves totally incompetent. They 
had also proven themselves to be extremely durable. Despite 
the suspension of habeas corpus in Ireland, they had still 
been able to attempt a few risings in Ireland. More 
ominously, some of their activities now centered on England. 
Gladstone was moving, albeit slowly, toward the realization 
that something had to be done for Ireland. Yet he still 
proceeded cautiously. By the time of Gray's motion in 
1867, he was willing, as an individual member, to support 
the formation of a committee to look into the condition of 
the Church of Ireland. He was not willing to comm~t the 
party to a program of Irish reform. As late as July of 
1867, Gladstone still felt that all he could give was his 
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personal support. Cardinal Cullen asked Gray to clarify 
Gladstone's position on the church question. Gladstone told 
Gray that he was npersonally free to support any adjustment 
approved by Ireland." 23 Gladstone, by mid-1867, was much 
more willing to address the issue of Irish church reform, 
yet he refused to acknowledge that it was an issue to be 
considered by the Liberal Party. Gladstone still did not 
feel that immediate action needed to be taken to reform the 
church on the part of the Party. Only after extensive study 
could either the Liberal Party or the country be ready to 
accede to the demands of the Irish. 24 
The event at Manchester proved to be of great 
significance. Not long after the incident he confided to 
John Bright, who recorded it in his diary, that the time had 
come to disestablish the Irish church: "An hour and a half 
with Mr. Gladstone this morning on future politics: On 
Ireland in particular. He is willing wholly to suppress 
State Church in Ireland, but with a wish it had not been 
necessary." 25 In a conversation with General Grey, after 
it was obvious that he [Gladstone] was to be the next Prime 
Minister, he told Grey that "he had made up his mind • 
that the Irish Church must be dealt with, when reading in 
the railroad, the account of the Fenian prisoners at 
Manchester." 26 
What was it about Manchester that so galvanized 
Gladstone? What was it about the events at Manchester that 
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convinced Gladstone that the time to end the established 
Church of Ireland was at hand? Gladstone had stated in his 
speech in support of the first suspension of the Habeas 
Corpus Act (on February 17, 1866) that, 
two generations ago a well spread rebellion in 
Ireland would have plunged whole provinces or 
extended districts in blood. In 1822, when 
the Habeas Corpus Act was suspended, there was 
a spirit of disaffection, powerful not in numbers 
only, but in other elements of s27ength, and that 
was not of foreign introduction. 
Gladstone also claimed in this same debate that the Irish, 
by their own "means and resources exclusively • [could] 
effectually and quickly extinguish all the machinations of 
those disloyal and misguided men." 28 Clearly the reaction 
to the events at Manchester had shown the Iri~h ready to 
give sympathy to the Fenian cause. The actions of Daunt, 
Cullen and The O'Donoghue clearly illustrated Ireland's 
discontent with Parliament's progress on the question of 
Irish reform. 29 
Once Gladstone had decided that the Irish church had 
to be disestablished, he wasted little time in acting on 
his conviction. At Southport he gave a speech before his 
constituents that outlined his views. He asked the audience 
if they would for one moment tolerate a Catholic church 
imposed upon them from without. He claimed that he wanted 
Ireland to be like Scotland so that "instead of hearing 
in every corner of Europe the most painful commentaries upon 
the policy of England towards Ireland--we may be able to 
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look our fellow Europeans of every nation in the 
face .,30 Gladstone went on to repeat the vast majority 
of arguments that he had heard in Parliament in favor of 
disestablishment. 31 
In February 1868 Gladstone read a book by John Maguire, 
entitled The Irish in America. 32 The book was written in 
1867, and was based on Maguire's travels in the United 
States and Canada. 
Maguire's book was an attempt to determine the opinion 
of Irish-Americans toward Great Britain. He wrote in the 
introduction that he was, 
••• anxious to ascertain the real nature, that is 
the strength or the intensity of the sentiment which 
I had reason to believe was entertained by the Irish 
in the United States towards the British Government; 
as I considered, and I hold rightly, that the 
existence of a strong sentiment or feeling of 
hostility is a far more serious cause of danger, 
in case of future misunderstanding or complication 
than any organ~3ation, however, apparently extensive 
or formidable. 
The book was also a call for Irish reform. Maguire hoped 
to promote Irish reform in Parliament in order to stop the 
steady deterioration of relations between Irish Catholics 
and the English. Maguire felt that any organization, no 
matter how small and disorganized, could grow as long as 
it could feed off of popular discontent: 
Though an organisation may be ill-designed or 
even ridiculous, or, on account of the folly, or 
violence, or treachery, of those who are responsible 
for its management, may come to a speedy dissolution, 
if it has its origin in an earnest and enduring 
feeling, it is significant of danger--it represents 
more than is seen; and die down as it may~ 4 it is sure to spring up again in some new form. 
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Maguire was, in the main, referring to the Fenians. Maguire 
felt that the Fenians were not interested in reform--because 
reform would undermine the basis of their support: 
The thorough-going Fenians--whether leaders or 
actors, or rank and file--would, if anything, 
prefer that the admitted causes of Irish discontent 
should not be removed; for they naturally argue--' If 
our hopes of regenerating Ireland be based upon 
revolution, it is better for our purpose that the 
various causes and sources be allowed to exist, and 
by their prolonged existence irritate and gall the 
public more and more, and thus keep the people in 
a conditio~5most favorable to revolutionary teaching.' 
Maguire compassionately called for reform while there was 
still time. He felt that as long as there were legitimate 
grievances in Ireland, that unhappy island would always be 
a problem for England--even if the Fenians disappeared: 
• though Fenian leaders may quarrel or betray, 
and Fenian organisations may wither or collapse there 
must be perpetual danger to the peace, the honour, 
if not the safety of England, from a power which it 
is i~possible 350 ignore, and madness to despise • • • 
The Fenians were a symptom of a greater illness. Thus, 
reform was not a surrender to Fenian demands. The Fenians 
were not directly concerned with the question of the Church 
of Ireland. Church disestablishment, however, did serve 
the purpose of removing a grievance. Once that grievance 
had been removed, Maguire thought that Ireland would again 
be serene and comfortable in her relations with England. 
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On March 16, 1868, Gladstone rose to give a speech 
upon Maguire's motion for a committee to look into the state 
of Ireland. He accused the government of failing to 
realize "in any degree at all approaching truth, the grave, 
and I would say solmn, fact that we have reached a crisis 
in the history of Ireland. 1137 Gladstone's words, although 
true, seem to be too harsh on the Conservatives. After all, 
while his party was in power, he and the Liberals had done 
little to address Irish discontent. Certainly, E. R. Norman 
has touched upon part of the reason. Norman feels that 
Gladstone addressed the issue of disestablishment in 1868 in 
order to head off the government's intent to address the 
issue of education. Gladstone did not believ~, by 1868, 
that the government should fund Catholic education. The 
Catholics, on the other hand, had no desire to see the 
spread of secular schools. The Conservative government 
wanted to address the issue of Irish reform by giving the 
Catholics part of what they wanted--denominational schools 
paid for by the State. Gladstone hoped to head off this 
action by holding out a larger prize: church 
disestablishment. 38 This perhaps makes Gladstone look 
opportunistic. Gladstone, as A. Ramm has pointed out, was 
more than willing to use power to further his own ambition. 
Yet there is no doubt, however, that his ambition was 
tempered by a strong sense of duty and morality; and 
certainly he would have preferred that Ireland be reformed 
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by his plans and ideas, not those of a minority government. 
Yet, Norman's analysis does not completely answer why 
the idea of addressing Irish grievances was so important to 
both Gladstone and the Conservatives in 1868. In his 
speech, and in others, including his 1868 election pamphlet, 
A Chapter of Autobiography, he constantly addressed the 
problem of the Fenians. He asked why the Irish in Canada 
and Australia had not revelled at the first sign of Fenian 
activity in their countries: 
Neither in Canada nor in Australia does the 
Irishman labour under the slightest difficulty with 
regard to the legal security he enjoys for the 
fruits of his industry and labour, nor is he 
confronted by the spirit or the remai~bng 
institutions of a hostile ascendancy. 
The English, he continued, had seen the "loathsome disease 
of Fenianism overflow into England. 1141 Gladstone further 
indicated that he had at long last recognized the pervasive 
nature of Irish discontent: 
in the present state of Ireland, with its suspended 
liberties and its continuing evils assuming a 
subtler, but perhaps on that account, a more 
formidable shape, and viewing that state of things 
which has grown up in this country in no small 
degree under the influences of the changes proposed 
and promoted by Her Majesty's present administration, 
I recognized that the time has come when this 
question ought to be broached, and when it is 42 broached it ought to be dealt with once for all. 
On March 20, 1868, he gave notice that he was going to 
present several motions to disestablish the Irish church. 43 
Gladstone came to the conclusion, after the incident at 
Manchester, that the time for disestablishment had arrived. 
What was to be gained by wooing the Irish away from the 
Fenians? A consistent theme through many of his speeches 
was the need to maintain the union between Ireland and 
Great Britain. In 1866, in a speech on the suspension of 
the Act of Habeas Corpus, Gladstone had claimed: 
We do not propose this measure because we believe 
that it is through English influence and English 
regiments that the connection between the two 
countries to be maintained. My firm belief is 
that the influence of Great Britain in every Irish 
difficulty is not a domineering and tyranizing, 
but a softening and mitigating influence; and that 
were Ireland detached from her political connection 
with this country, and left to her own unaided 
agencies, it might be that the strife of parties 
would there burst forth in a form ca!~ulated to 
strike horror through the land • • • 
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He repeated this sentiment two years later when he said that 
delay in addressing Irish grievances "tends to compromise 
and cripple the strength of the empire." 45 In 1863 the 
Irish, while to some degree discontented, had not seemed 
overly so. The events after Manchester illustrated that a 
significant portion of Irish society was seriously 
discontented. They were, in fact, discontented enough to 
express sympathy for an organization that they had earlier 
condemned. Gladstone realized that the continued existence 
of outstanding grievances could possibly convince many 
Irish that the only way to redress those grievances would 
be to break the ties between Great Britain and Ireland. 
Gladstone, the cautious politician that he was, needed 
proof of that discontentment. Public sympathy for the 
Fenians provided the impetus that Gladstone needed to 
introduce motions for the disestablishment of the Irish 
church. 
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CONCLUSION 
PACIFY IRELAND 
Gladstone, as we have seen, was a cautious and careful 
politician--to a degree. Before 1867 he was willing to 
consider disestablishment as a "future" question. In this 
sense he was not a politician motivated by a crisis. His 
preferred method of operation was to work the issue out 
slowly--as he attempted to do with parliamentary reform in 
1865. Once the situation hit crisis proportions, however, 
that element in him that Magnus called "volcinic" erupted. 1 
The results of such a political technique had profound 
effects. To the Irish it seemed as if the only way to get 
reform was through exhibitions of large scale discontent. 
O'Neill Daunt noted in his journal a letter from Carvell 
Williams: "He seems to think that this Fenian affair may 
accelerate the disendowment of the State Church by 
compelling statesmen to take measures calculated to remove 
or diminish the prevalent disaffection." 2 Nor was the 
timing of disestablishment lost upon the Fenians: 
When William E. Gladstone in 1869 introduced the 
Bill to disestablish the Protestant Church in 
Ireland, he admitted in his speech that his new 
outlook on Irish affairs was due to the intensity 
of Fenianism. His remarks on that occasion proved 
a stronger argument in favor of physical force--and 
even Terrorism--on the part of Ireland to secure
3 justice and freedom than any Irishman ever made. 
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Gladstone had succeeded in disestablishing the Irish church, 
yet, with advantage of hindsight, he also in a sense helped 
continue the awareness on the part of the Irish that only 
violence could convince the English to take note of Irish 
grievances. 
How can we make sense of the Fenian contribution to 
Gladstone's decision to disestablish the Irish church in 
1868? E. R. Norman has stated that Gladstone was convinced 
of the "urgency" to act by the Fenians. 4 In a sense he is 
correct, but the influence of the Fenians went beyond a 
sense of "urgency." Gladstone's words, now famous, upon 
hearing that he was to become Prime Minister were, "My 
mission is to pacify Ireland." Ireland, by late 1867, was 
in a chronic state of discontent. The fact that the Fenians 
were gaining support among the Irish disturbed the English. 
The fact that they were considered to be a foreign import 
by the English only added to the realization that, if 
grievances were allowed to fester, the Irish would cleave to 
any form of rebellion--no matter where it came from nor how 
ridiculous it might be. Disestablishment, in part, was 
intended to help smooth over the rising discontent in 
Ireland. Earl Spencer, who was appointed Viceroy of 
Ireland in 1868, commented in a letter to Lord Clarendon 
that "I am sure that the Church Act has had a beneficial 
effect on the Priests; but their inveterate passion for 
politics keeps them still in excitement ••• " 5 
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The Fenians played a significant role in Gladstone's 
timing on the Irish church question. Until the Fenians 
presented Gladstone with the spector of an Ireland riven 
from England, he had been content to allow the issue to 
proceed at a slow and steady pace. Gladstone moved quickly 
to redress Irish grievances once the Fenians, after the 
incident at Manchester, had shown that they could generate 
sympathy on the part of a large number of the Irish. The 
Fenians did more than convince Gladstone of the urgency of 
disestablishment. They convinced him that to delay any 
further would seriously jeopardize the existence of the 
union between the two nations. F. s. L. Lyons caught the 
essence of the significance of the Fenians to Irish history. 
While Fenian violence turned many against the Irish, 
••• it could equally well prompt thoughtful men 
to look beyond the violence to what had created the 
violence and to wonder if the time had not come to 
woo Ireland from the path of desperation by a 
sustained attempt at constructive reform. That one 
of those who now began to think this way was 
Gladstone was not the least, if perhaps the most 
unexpected6 of the legacies left by the Fenians to posterity. 
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2 w. J. O'Neill Daunt, A Life Spent for Ireland 
(1896; Dublin: Irish UP, 1927) 16 March 1867, 236. 
3 John Devoy, Recollections of an Irish Rebel (New 
York: c. P. Young, 1929) 250. 
4 Norman, Catholic Church, 339. 
5 Peter Gordon, ed., The Papers of the Fifth Earl 
Spencer (Delapse Abbey, Northampton: Northamptonshire 
Record Society, 1981) 26 October 1869, 79. 
6 Lyons 127. 
135 
SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY 
PRIMARY MATERIAL 
Annual Register 
Argyll, Eighth Duke of. Autobiography and Memoirs. 2 vols. 
1906. 
Blakiston, Noel, ed. The Roman Question. London: Chapman 
and Hall, 1962. 
Bright, John. The Diaries of John Bright. Ed. R. A. J. 
Walling. New York: William Morrow & Co., 1931. 
Speeches on Questions of Public Policy by the Right 
Honorable John Bright, M.P. Ed. James Rogers et al. 
London: MacMillan and Co., 1880. 
Buckle, George, ed. The Letters of Queen Victoria. 2nd 
series. New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1926. 
Cavendish, Lady Frederick. The Diary of Lady Frederick 
Cavendish. Ed. J. Bailey. London: John Murray, 
1927. 
Daunt, w. J. O'Neill. Ireland and Her Agitators. Dublin: 
P. C. D. Warren, n.d. 
A Life Spent for Ireland. Dublin: Irish UP, 1927. 
(first published in London: T. Fisher Union, 1896). 
Devoy, John. Recollections of an Irish Rebel. New York: 
C. P. Young, 1929. 
Foreign Relations of the United States. New York: Kraus 
Reprint Corp., 1965. 
Gladstone, William E. "A Chapter of Autobiography". 
Gleanings of Past Years. Vol. 7. London: John 
Murray, 1879, 97-151. 
Correspondence on Church and Religion of w. E. 
Gladstone. Ed. D. c. Lathbury. London: John 
Murray, 1910. 
137 
The Gladstone Diaries. Ed. H. c. G. Matthew. Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1982. 
Speeches of the Right Honourable William Ewart 
Gladstone, M.P., in South-West Lancashire, October 
1868. Liverpool: E. Smith & Co., 1868. 
Speeches on Great Questions of the Day. 2nd ed. 
London: J. C. Hotten, 1869. 
w. E. Gladstone (The Prime Ministers' Papers Series). 
Ed. John Brooke and Mary Sorenson. London: Her 
Majesty's Stationary Office, 1978. 
Guedalla, P., ed. Gladstone and Palmerston. New York: 
Harper and Brothers, 1928. 
The Queen and Mr. Gladstone. 2 vol. Garden City: 
Doubleday, Doran & Co., 1934. 
Hansards Parliamentary Debates, third series (1830-1891). 
Hardy, Gathorne. Diary of Gathorne Hardy, Later Lord 
Cranbrook, 1866-1892: Political Selections. Ed. 
Nancy Johnson. Oxford: Oxford UP, 1981. 
Illustrated London News. 
Maguire, John F. The Irish in America. New York: Arno 
Press, 1969. 
Quarterly Review. 
Ramm, Agatha, ed. The Political Correspondence of Mr. 
Gladstone and Lord Granville 1868-1876. 2 vol. 
Oxford: Oxford UP, 1952. 
Russell, Lord John. The Later Correspondence of Lord John 
Russell. Ed. G. P. Gooch. London: Longmans, Green 
and Co., 1925. 
Russell, John Earl. Recollections and Suggestions. 
Boston: Roberts Brothers, 1875. 
Smith, Goldwin. Reminiscences. New York: MacMillan Co., 
1910. 
Spencer, Fifth Earl. The Red Earl. The Papers of the 
Fifth Earl Spencer. Ed. Peter Gordon. Delapse 
Abbey: Northamptonshire Record Society, 1981. 
Stanley, Lord Edward Henry. Disraeli, Derby and the 
Conservative Party. Journals and Memoirs of Edward 
Henry, Lord Stanley. Ed. John Vincent. New York: 
Barnes & Noble, 1978. 
The Times {London). 
138 
West, Sir Algernon. Recollections. New York: Harper and 
Publishers, 1900. 
SECONDARY MATERIAL 
Beales, Derek. "Gladstone and His First Ministry." 
Historical Journal 26 (1983): 987-998. 
Beckett, James c. The Anglo-Irish Tradition. Ithaca: 
Cornell UP, 1976. 
The Making of Modern Ireland, 1603-1923. New York: 
Knopf, 1966, 1969. 
A Short History of Ireland. London: Hutchinson, 
1966. 
Birrell, Francis. Gladstone. New York: MacMillan, 1933. 
Blake, Robert. Disraeli. New York: St. Martin's Press, 
1967. 
Bottigheimer, Karl S. Ireland and the Irish. New York: 
Columbia UP, 1982. 
Bowen, Desmond. Paul Cardinal Cullen and the Shaping of 
Modern Irish Catholicism. Dublin: Gill and 
MacMillan, 1983. 
Boyce, David G. Nationalism in Ireland. Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins UP, 1982. 
Checkland, S. G. 
1 764-1851. 
The Gladstones. A Family Biography 
Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1971. 
Comerford, R. v. The Fenians in Context. Dublin: 
Wolfhound Press, 1985. 
Drew, Mary. Acton, Gladstone and Others. Freeport: Books 
for Libraries, 1968. 
139 
Edinger, George A., and E. J. c~ Neep. The Grand Old Man; 
a Gladstone Spectrum. London: Meuthen, 1936. 
Eversley, George. Gladstone and Ireland. The Irish Policy 
of Parliament From 1850-1894. London: Meuthen, 
1912. 
Eyck, Erich. Gladstone. London: G. Allen & Unwin, 1938. 
Feuchtwanger, E. J. 
1914. London: 
Democracy and Empire. Britain 1865-
Edward Arnold, 1985. 
Gladstone. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1975. 
Gathorne-Hardy, Alfred Erskine. 
of Cranbrook. New York: 
Gathorne Hardy, First Earl 
Longmans, 1910. 
Gladstone, Herbert. After Thirty Years. London: 
MacMillan, 1928. 
Hamer, D. A. Liberal Politics in the Age of Gladstone and 
Rosebery. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972. 
Hammond, J. L., and M. R. D. Foot. Gladstone and 
Liberalism. London: English Universities Press, 
1966. 
Hammond, J. L. Gladstone and the Irish Nation. 2nd ed. 
Hamden: Archon Books, 1964. 
Hanham, H. J. Elections and Party Management. New York: 
Longmans, 1959. 
Harmon, Maurice, ed. Fenians and Fenianism. Seattle: 
University of Washington Press, 1970. 
Hoppen, K. Theodore. Elections, Politics, and Society in 
Ireland 1832-1885. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984. 
"The Franchise and Electoral Politics in England and 
Ireland 1832-1885." History 70 (1985): 202-217. 
Jagger, Peter J., ed. Gladstone, Politics, and Religion. 
London: MacMillan, 1985. 
Jenkins, T. A. "Gladstone, the Whigs, and the Leadership 
of the Liberal Party." Historical Journal 27 (1984): 
337-360. 
Kinzer, Bruce L. The Gladstonian Turn of Mind. Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 1985. 
Larkin, Emmet. "The Devotional Revolution in Ireland, 
1850-1875." American Historical Review LXXVII 
(1872): 625-652. 
Lyons, F. S. L. Ireland Since the Famine. London: 
Fontana, 1973. 
MacSuibhne, Peadar. Paul Cullen and His Contemporaries. 
Naas, Leinster Leader Ltd., 1961. 
140 
Magnus, Philip. Gladstone: A Biography. New York: E. P. 
Dutton, 1964. 
Mansergh, Nicholas. The Irish Question, 1840-1921. 
Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1965. 
McDowell, R. B. The Irish Administration. Westport, 
Connecticut, 1964, 1976. 
Monypenny, William, and George E. Buckle. The Life of 
Benjamin Disraeli. New York: MacMillan, 1916. 
Moody, T. w., et al. A New History of Ireland. Oxford: 
Oxford UP, 1976. 
Moody, T. W., and Leon O'Broin. "The I.R.B. Supreme 
Council, 1868-78." Irish Historical Studies XIX, 
no. 75 (1975): 286-332. 
Moody, T. W., and F. X. Martin, ed. The Course of Irish 
History. Cork: Mercier Press, 1967. 
Morley, John. The Life of William Ewart Gladstone. New 
York: MacMillan Co., 1921 (1903). 
Newsinger, John. "Old Chartists, Fenians, and New 
Socialists." Eire-Ireland 17 (1982): 19-45. 
Norman, E. R. The Catholic Church and Ireland in the Age of 
Rebellion 1859-1873. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1965. 
A History of Modern Ireland. London: Allen & Urwin, 
1971. 
O'Broin, Leon. Revolutionary Underground. Dublin: Gill 
and MacMillan, 1976. 
O'Farrell, Patrick. England and Ireland Since 1800. 
Oxford: Oxford UP, 1975. 
Ireland's English Question. New York: Schocken 
Books, 1971. 
141 
Prest, John. Lord John Russell. Columbia: University of 
South Carolina Press, 1972. 
Quinlivan, Patrick, and Paul Rose. The Fenians in England 
1865-1872. New York: Riverrun Press, 1982. 
Ramm, Agatha. "Gladstone's Religion." Historical Journal 
28 (1985): 327-340. 
Read, Donald. England, 1868-1914: The Age of Urban 
Democracy. New York: Longman, 1979. 
Richter, Donald c. Riotous Victorians. Athens: Ohio UP, 
1981. 
Ryan, Desmond: 
Stephens. 
1967. 
The Fenian Chief. A Biography of James 
Coral Gables: University of Miami Press, 
Shannon, Richard. Gladstone. Chapel Hill: University of 
North Carolina Press, 1984. 
Smith, Goldwin. Irish History and Irish Character. 
Oxford & London: J. H. and J. Parker, 1862. 
My Memory of Gladstone. London: T. F. Unwin, 1904. 
Stansky, Peter. 
York: w. 
Gladstone. A Progress in Politics. 
w. Norton, 1979. 
New 
Steele, E. D. "Gladstone and Ireland." Irish Historical 
Studies 17, no. 65: 58-88. 
Thomson, David. England in the Nineteenth Century. New 
York: Penguin Books, 1950, 1978. 
Townshend, c. "Modernization and Nationalism: Perspectives 
in Recent Irish History." History LXVI (1981): 
231-243. 
Townshend, Charles. Political Violence in Ireland. 
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983. 
Trevelyan, G. M. The Life of John Bright. Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin Co., 1913. 
Vincent, John. The Formation of the British Liberal Party. 
New York: Scribner, 1966. 
Walker, Mabel G. The Fenian Movement. Colorado Springs: 
R. Myles, 1969. 
142 
Whyte, J. H. "Bishop Moriarty on Disestablishment and the 
Union, 1868." Irish Historical Studies X (1956): 
193-199. 
Whyte, John. "The Influence of the Catholic Clergy on 
Elections in Nineteenth-Century Ireland." English 
Historical Review LXXV (1960): 239-259. 
Williams, w. E. The Rise of Gladstone to the Leadership of 
the Liberal Party, 1859-1868. New York: Octagon 
Books, 1934, 1973. 
Woodward, Ernest L. The Age of Reform, 1815-1870. Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1938, 1962. 
